


*Food prices rise rapidly following Russian invasion of Ukraine*

**KEY MESSAGES**

- Household purchasing power has been significantly eroded by years of economic decline and compounding shocks. Given lack of income and very high prices of food and non-food commodities, many have exhausted available livelihood coping strategies, forcing millions toward more severe food coping strategies such as skipping meals. Eight million beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance have been receiving reduced rations since late 2021. At the area level, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are likely widespread. Many households facing ration reductions have likely been unable to compensate for the sudden reduction in food and income, with an increasing number likely to face widening consumption gaps and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes during local lean periods.
- Despite ceasefires announced by the Sana'a-based authorities (SBA) and the Saudi-led coalition, fighting has continued throughout last week of March, with Marib worst affected. Conflict continues to cause new population displacement, further straining resources at displacement sites. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as of March 30, an estimated **24,496 people** had been displaced since January, most of whom were in Al Hudaydah, Shabwah, Marib, and Taizz governorates.
- In areas controlled by the internationally-recognized government (IRG), the Yemeni Rial depreciated slightly in March despite improved supply of hard currency in markets. In March 2022, the parallel market exchange rate in Aden averaged 1,239 YER/USD, 11 percent higher than in the previous month and 39 percent higher than same time last year, according to data from [FAO](#). Meanwhile, in SBA-controlled areas, strict control measures together with stable foreign currency inflows from domestic trade have contributed to keeping local currency exchange rates largely stable.
- Yemen is highly dependent on imports for its food supply and typically sources a significant share of staple wheat from Russia and Ukraine. As such, food prices have increased significantly across the country in March, with IRG areas worst affected. In IRG areas, the cost of the Minimum Food Basket (MFB) increased significantly by 12 percent from February to March 2022, to reach levels 85 percent higher the same period of last year. In SBA areas, the cost of the MFB increased by a full 13 percent from February to March, to reach levels 37 percent higher than last year.


Current food security outcomes, March 2022



Source: FEWS NET

FEWS NET classification is IPC-compatible. IPC-compatible analysis follows key IPC protocols but does not necessarily reflect the consensus of national food security partners.

**SEASONAL CALENDAR FOR A TYPICAL YEAR**



Source: FEWS NET

**NATIONAL OVERVIEW**

*Current Situation*

As the conflict in Yemen enters its eighth year, the prospect of peace remains elusive. Protracted conflict during years of political stalemate has driven economic decline in the country, pushing more people into poverty and driving a worsening humanitarian situation. Conflict continues to discourage business and investment in the country, damage or destroy of civilian property and infrastructure including homes, farms, schools, healthcare facilities, markets, and telecommunication networks, and drive population displacement, disconnecting people from their assets, livelihoods, and social networks. This has driven income losses and has significantly eroded household coping capacity, leaving many highly vulnerable to rising prices of staple foods and other essential living expenses.


January 2022 was the **deadliest month** on record for civilians since 2018. While February witnessed a decline by **two thirds** in **conflict**-driven casualties compared to January, airstrikes by the Saudi-led coalition (SLC) continued to target Sana'a and surrounding governorates, causing civilian casualties and major damage caused to civilian infrastructure, according to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project (CIMP). In March, the number of battles at the national level declined relative to February, while the number of incidents of explosions and remote violence increased but remained below January levels according to data from the **Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED)**. In January and early February, heavy attacks launched at Marib city took a considerable toll on civilian lives and public infrastructure.

As of March 30, an estimated **24,496 people** had been newly **displaced** since the beginning of the year across governorates monitored by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), most of whom were in Al Hudaydah, Shabwah, Marib, and Taizz governorates. Despite reduced levels of conflict in Marib in February and March relative to previous months, IOM estimated that around 1,998 individuals were displaced in Marib in February and around 1,356 were displaced in March. New influxes of families arriving to displacement sites continue to strain already over-stretched resources at these sites.

After years of conflict and political instability, the ability of internationally-recognized government (IRG) to oversee collection of revenue (from taxes, customs duties, and oil exports) and to regulate speculation in the currency market is highly limited. This continues to prevent economic recovery and limit the availability of revenue for the provision of essential services and public sector salary payments. **Macroeconomic conditions** remain poor overall. **Yemen's Gross Domestic Product (GDP)** in 2021 was only 19.47 billion USD, less than half of what it had been in 2014 prior to the conflict (Figure 1).


**Crude oil production levels** in Yemen declined significantly with the conflict. In recent years, production levels have been increasing somewhat as the government seeks to expand this important source of foreign exchange, though production remains below pre-conflict levels. Production had reached 70,000 barrels per day as of **August 2021** according to the US Energy Information Administration, up from 55,000 barrels per day in 2020. Global oil prices also **rose significantly** from 2020 to 2021 and have reached record highs in March 2022 following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As such, **foreign exchange earnings** from oil exports in 2021 and early 2022 are likely significantly higher than in 2020, even with recent slight disruptions to oil production due to civil unrest in Hadramout and conflict in Shabwah. This has likely been supporting the foreign currency auctions held regularly by the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden (CBY-Aden) since October 2021. On **February 15, 2022**, the CBY-Aden increased the advertised auction amount from 15 million to 20 million USD, likely at least in part to prevent any currency

Projected food security outcomes, March to May 2021



Source: FEWS NET

Projected food security outcomes, June to September 2022



Source: FEWS NET

FEWS NET classification is IPC-compatible. IPC-compatible analysis follows key IPC protocols but does not necessarily reflect the consensus of national food security partners.


bottlenecks with the advent of Ramadan, during which demand for importing food and non-food commodities typically increases. Demand for hard currency through the public auction mechanism varies from one round to the other depending on market needs. As of [March 8, 2022](#), demand for hard currency was 83 percent of the auctioned amount, with a 2 percent increase in the bidding rate compared to [March 4, 2022](#) (Figure 3). Auctions continue to provide some temporary support to the local currency by fulfilling market demand while allowing the CBY-Aden to exert greater control over the currency market.

Despite the improved supply of hard currency in markets, the **Yemeni Rial (YER)** depreciated slightly in March in areas under IRG control. As of March 2022, the parallel market exchange rate in Aden averaged 1,239 YER/USD, 11 percent higher than in the previous month, 39 percent higher than same time last year, and over 400 percent higher than pre-February 2015 (pre-conflict) levels, according to data from [FAO](#). Meanwhile, in SBA-controlled areas, strict control measures together with stable foreign currency inflows from domestic trade have contributed to keeping local exchange rates largely stable at around 600 YER/USD for more than three years.

Agricultural production in Yemen is expected to contribute [an estimated 15-20](#) percent of domestic food consumption requirements, and less than 10 percent of domestic staple cereal requirements. Most of Yemen’s staple food supply is covered by **commercial imports**, mostly secured by a few large traders with significant storage capacity at ports (Table 1). Given minimal government support for importation—including no recent action to resume the Letter of Credit import financing mechanism—most traders are expected to be meeting their hard currency needs through the CBY-Aden’s public currency auctions. Yemen’s dependence on imports for its staple food supply makes the country highly vulnerable to global food supply and price shocks. As such, the impacts of the **Russian invasion of Ukraine** including rising global prices are of high concern for food prices in Yemen. Furthermore, Yemen typically sources a significant share of its staple food supply from Russia and Ukraine, putting the country at risk of shortages of key commodities, depending on traders’ ability to source from alternative markets.


According to the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI), Yemen **imported** around 3,415,000 MT of wheat grain through all of Yemen’s main seaports in 2021. Of this, approximately 2.55 million tons were imported through the western Red Sea ports of Al Hudaydah and Al Salif, 23 percent of which was imported from Russia and 17 percent from Ukraine. The MTI estimates that **wheat grain stocks** in areas under IRG control are sufficient to cover approximately [four months’](#) worth of needs. In areas controlled by the Sana’a-based authorities (SBA), MTI expects that 256,185 MT of wheat grain currently stored in Al Hudaydah and As Salif silos and 250,000 MT more expected to arrive in the coming few months will be sufficient to cover approximately six months’ worth of needs. Yemen also imported 60 million USD worth of sunflower oil in 2019, with 82, 13, and 3 percent from Turkey, Egypt and both Russia and Ukraine, respectively. However, a significant amount of the imports from Turkey and Egypt were re-exports from Russia and Ukraine.

**Figure 1.** Yemen’s GDP from 2008 to 2021, billions of USD, current prices



Source: FEWS NET using data from Statista

**Figure 2.** Prices of USD (YER/USD) in 25 CBY-Aden foreign currency auctions



Source: FEWS NET using data from the Central Bank of Yemen

**Table 1.** Storage capacity at Yemen’s main seaports

PORTS	COMPANY	STORAGE CAPACITY (MT)	MILLING CAPACITY (MT/DAY)
Aden	YCFMS (HSA Group)	230,000	3,750
	Al-Rowaishan Group	110,000	600
	<b>Total Aden:</b>	<b>340,000</b>	<b>4,350</b>
Al-Hodeidah/Saleef	National Grain Silos	90,000	N/A
	YCFMS Al-Hodeidah (HSA Group)	130,000	2,250
	YIFICO (Al-Habbari) (Saleef port)	150,000	1,800
	Fahem Group (Saleef port)	120,000	N/A
	Arabian Company (Yahya Suhail)	60,000	500
	<b>Total Al-Hodeidah and Saleef</b>	<b>550,000</b>	<b>4,550</b>

Source: World Bank

In March, rising global prices of staple grains and cooking oils continued to drive **significant price increases** in Yemen as traders worked toward sourcing food commodities from alternative markets at higher prices. Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, food prices were already rising in Yemen due to depreciation of the currency in IRG areas and rising fuel prices across the country. In IRG areas, the cost of the Minimum Food Basket (MFB) increased significantly by 12 percent from February to March 2022, to reach levels 85 percent higher the same period of last year and 560 percent higher than prices in February 2015, according to [data from FAO](#). Meanwhile, in SBA areas, the cost of the MFB increased by a full 13 percent from February to March, to reach levels 37 percent higher than last year and 237 percent higher than February 2015. Price increases continued throughout March. On March 21, media reports indicated that prices of basic food commodities had increased significantly, by as much as **38 percent** relative to early March, with staple wheat flour and vegetable oil recording the largest increases and with rural areas worst affected. This is likely attributable to severe energy shortages and rising global prices.

SBA areas have been worst affected by severe **fuel shortages** and rising transportation costs. As of March 2022, severe shortages of fuel at official stations persisted in SBA areas, with parallel market petrol prices 20 percent higher than in the previous month and 125 percent higher than the same time last year, according to data from [FAO](#). According to key informants, petrol was sporadically available at commercial fuel stations, at prices 16 percent higher than the previous month and with very long queues. Shortages of **cooking gas** across the country are also forcing many to use wood for cooking, contributing to deforestation that will impact the environment and agriculture in the future, including through erosion.

Yemen has significant climatic diversity and high agricultural potential. However, **crop production** continues to be adversely affected by conflict and rising production costs—including for fuel needed for irrigation water pumps—with the scale of food crop production most reduced over the years due to relatively lower profit margins and the impacts of land erosion due to floods. Agriculture remains important for the economy and livelihoods, however, and provides some limited seasonal food and income to farming households. In 2019, agriculture contributed around **15 percent of real GDP** and provided jobs for around **25 percent of the labor force** (compared to around 41 percent of the labor force in 2014). In lowland areas—including many coastal areas and the eastern plateau—cereal harvesting activities are expected to have concluded in February, temporarily increasing poor households' access to income from labor opportunities and, for farming households, to food from own production and income from crop sales. The ongoing fruit and vegetable production season is also likely supporting seasonal improvements in income-earning in lowland areas. Meanwhile, in the highlands, access to food and income from agricultural activities is currently expected to be at seasonally low levels during the agricultural off-season.

In addition to the long-term impacts of conflict on the scale of crop production in Yemen, many farmers continue to face acute challenges to their livelihoods due to active conflict, fuel shortages, and high costs of inputs. Affected farmers are often **unable to harvest and/or market their crops** on time, resulting in significant crop losses, with farmers in SBA-controlled areas generally worst affected. For example, [in late 2021, many farmers in Marib](#) were unable to harvest or market their orange crops due to conflict-related road blockages and high fuel prices. Orange production in Marib reduced [by an estimated 30 percent](#), leading to income losses for many farming households. Meanwhile, according to key informants, onion farmers in Abyan also realized reduced profits this season due to over-production and lower prices.

**Livestock body conditions** in the highlands are currently expected to be seasonally poor due to typical scarcity of pasture and fodder from January to March. In coastal areas along the Red Sea (Tihama Plain) and the Gulf of Aden and in Hadramaut Al Wadi in the eastern plateau, pasture is expected to be seasonally available, supported by scattered precipitation in recent winter months. This is likely supporting seasonally improved livestock body conditions. Across the country, rising production costs including for commercial fodder and veterinary care continue to strain pastoralist livelihoods. Particularly during the dry season when fodder prices are high, many poor pastoralist households are forced to sell livestock at reduced prices as a coping strategy to avoid food consumption gaps.

Income from **cross-border remittances** likely remains below pre-COVID levels due to restrictive labor policies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). [According to data from IOM](#), the number of undocumented Yemenis returning from the KSA has increased significantly in recent months (Figure 3), likely due to increased Saudi control measures, according to key informants. This is putting additional pressure on families who typically rely on remittances. Meanwhile, **government salary payments** are not adjusted to keep up with inflation and, as such, the real value of income from salaries continues to decline significantly, on top of typical delays and non-payment. Meanwhile, incomes from many other typical sources have declined significantly in SBA areas due to severe fuel shortages and declining purchasing power. In IRG areas, inflation and rising levels of insecurity and civil unrest since late 2021 have forced many small businesses to close, according to key informants.

In recent years, wage rates for laborers have generally increased, but not at the same rate as rising prices. However, in March 2022, the share of the MFB that an agricultural laborer could purchase at prevailing prices and wage rates in March was only 2



percent less than last year, on average at the national level, according to data from FAO. For unskilled wage laborers, this figure was around 3 percent lower than the same time last year. This unusual stability is due to significant wage increases in IRG-controlled areas since late 2021 alongside a significant decline in the cost of the MFB in December driven by temporary appreciation of the currency (though rising food prices have since brought the cost of the MFB close to December levels in IRG-controlled areas). However, this does not consider **demand for labor**, which has likely declined in many areas due to rising fuel prices and declining purchasing power among those who hire labor.


Overall, income-earning has likely not kept up with rising prices. **Purchasing power** continues to decline for millions of households, with a growing number unable to meet their minimum food requirements. Of particular concern are households with limited or irregular/seasonal sources of income.

In late December 2021, the World Food Programme (WFP) announced a **30 percent reduction in emergency humanitarian food assistance** rations—from around 80 percent to around 50-60 percent of households’ theoretical energy requirements based on an average of 2,100 kilocalories per person per day—for 8 million people in Al Maharah, Aden, Hadramout, Taizz, Al Hudaydah, Sa’ada, Al Mahwit, Dhamar, and Raymah governorates, due to funding shortfalls. Beneficiaries of all modalities of assistance were affected. Beneficiaries in SBA-controlled areas of Amanat Al Asimah, Sana’a, Ibb, and Al Bayda have continued to receive assistance only once every two months since April 2020. Overall, in February 2022, 12.9 million people were assisted, of whom 8 million people received reduced assistance rations. According to information from FSAC, cash transfer beneficiaries receive benefits that are adjusted for their household size, while beneficiaries who receive in-kind or voucher modalities receive rations for a household of seven, regardless of household size.

Yemen has one of the highest rates of **child malnutrition** in the world, driven by insufficient food consumption, poor sanitation and hygiene, and communicable diseases. Conflict and limited government revenue have reduced availability of water and sanitation infrastructure and crippled social and health services, with many children unable to access to important vaccines, such as measles and polio, and nutrition and health treatment. Water shortages and high prices continue to increase the risk of water-borne diseases in many areas. According to a nutrition SMART survey conducted jointly by UNICEF and the Yemeni government in November and December 2021, the prevalence of global acute malnutrition (GAM) among children under five as measured by weight-for-height z-score (WHZ) exceeded the WHO emergency threshold (more than 15 percent) in Hajjah, Abyan, Taizz, and Al Hudaydah governorates, despite ongoing humanitarian interventions.

After more than seven years of conflict, poor macroeconomic conditions, reduced access to income, rising prices, and overall declining purchasing power, many households have already exhausted available livelihood coping strategies, forcing millions to adopt more severe food consumption based coping strategies, including skipping meals, reducing meal size, or even sleeping without food. Though rural households are likely benefiting from some limited seasonal support from income-earning associated with land preparation activities in the highlands and food from the recently concluded cereal harvest in the lowlands, prices of food and other essential commodities such as fuel have risen significantly since late February and humanitarian assistance rations have been reduced in many areas. Millions are likely facing consumption gaps, with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes widespread at the area level. Highest concern exists for those who are market dependent for food in both urban and rural areas and who typically depend on non-diversified and irregular/seasonal income sources (including those primarily dependent on labor wages, some government salaries, and revenue from small businesses) and who are not receiving humanitarian assistance. Also of concern are households who are heavily dependent on humanitarian assistance as their main food and income source—especially households with large families who receive in-kind or voucher benefits, as these are based on a household size of seven—and who are receiving reduced rations, as many households have likely been unable to compensate for the sudden reduction in food and income. Worst-affected households—including those with large families who are receiving insufficient assistance—are likely in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

**Figure 3.** Number of Yemeni returnees from KSA, monthly, by travel document status



Source: IOM

*Assumptions*

The most likely scenario for the March to September 2022 projection period is based on the following key national-level assumptions:

- **Conflict** will likely continue at current high levels, with typical fluctuations in the intensity of clashes. Cross-border attacks by SBA forces into the KSA and the UAE—and retaliatory airstrikes on SBA territory (especially in Sana’a and neighboring governorates)—will likely continue, causing civilian casualties and displacement.
  - Given the counter-offensive by pro-government forces, it is no longer considered most likely that SBA forces will capture Marib city during the projection period (but see “events that might change the outlook” table below for the alternative). However, heavy clashes will likely persist as pro-government forces continue pushing for gains in Marib province.
- **Conflict-related access constraints** are expected to persist. Major south-north commercial routes are likely to remain closed. Given shifting frontlines and bureaucratic impediments, some areas are likely to experience short periods of disruptions to humanitarian assistance delivery.
- **Emergency food assistance** is expected to continue at current levels throughout the projection period.<sup>1</sup> This is based on recent financial commitments to support humanitarian operations in Yemen including 300 million USD from the KSA which, added to the nearly 1.3 billion USD pledged, will likely prevent further ration reductions. Meanwhile, rising costs of assistance provision will likely prevent WFP from increasing ration sizes during the projection period. However, significant uncertainty exists, linked to actual levels of donor funding—which may be threatened by expectations for inflation in donor countries, rising costs of global commodities including fuel, wheat, and cooking oils, and high global assistance needs—and the humanitarian community’s level of concern for rising prices in Yemen (see “events that might change the outlook” table below).
- Income from **cross-border remittances** is expected to seasonally increase during the month of Ramadan (mostly April) but will then reduce and will likely remain below pre-COVID levels during the projection period due to restrictive labor policies and declining purchasing power affecting Yemenis in the KSA.
- Income from **domestic remittances** is expected to remain below levels recorded before late 2019/early 2020 due to continued economic decline, disruption of livelihoods, and declining purchasing power among Yemenis. Households in SBA areas who receive remittances from households in IRG areas are expected to be worst affected due to the widening gap in exchange rates and high associated transfer fees, which have reduced the received value of domestic transfers by around half since 2020.
- Given forecast La Niña conditions, **cumulative rainfall** in Yemen’s first rainy season from March to May 2022 is most likely to be below average, with risk of flooding also expected to be below average during this time. Cumulative rainfall during the beginning of Yemen’s second rainy season from July to September is most likely to be above average, though uncertainty exists due to the long lead time of the forecast.
- Risk of **cyclone strikes** and associated flooding for Socotra and the southern Aden Gulf coast is highest from mid-April to mid-June and October to December. Due to forecast above-average sea surface temperatures from March to June, risk of cyclone strikes is expected to be above average during the peak period through June 2022. From July to September 2022, average risk of cyclone strikes is expected.

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<sup>1</sup> FEWS NET’s expectations in early March were for further significant reductions to humanitarian assistance in the June to September period. This was based on lower humanitarian funding levels relative to last year alongside WFP’s stated plans to reduce assistance provision further—to cover only 2.6 million people—beginning in June, which was a key assumption for the recent IPC analysis. Even at that time, FEWS NET’s analysis diverged from WFP’s stated plans based on historical patterns and the expectation that it would be politically and practically infeasible to reduce the number of assistance beneficiaries rather than reducing ration sizes. As such, given reduced funding levels, FEWS NET expected that further ration reductions would occur in the second half of the projection period (June to September). Of note is the fact that, since then, WFP’s stated plans to reduce assistance levels to cover only 6.4 million people in the January to May period have not manifested (with 12.9 million people assisted in February 2022 and with 13.3 million people targeted in March 2022). Even more recently, FEWS NET further revised this analysis given significant financial commitments to support humanitarian operations in Yemen, including 300 million USD from the World Bank and 300 million USD from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; this brings total funding levels close to levels at this time last year, and FEWS NET now expects humanitarian assistance to continue at current levels.

- **Food crop production levels** will likely be similar to last year but significantly below pre-conflict levels due to the long-term impacts of reduced access to land and rising production costs. Anticipated continued fuel shortages and rising fuel and fertilizer prices, alongside below-average rainfall in the first season, will likely result in increased costs of production, transport, and processing, reducing profit margins for farmers and actors along the supply chain. However, overall negative impacts of rising prices on agricultural are expected to be limited, as farming households have already faced inability to afford inputs (fuel, fertilizer) for many years, with many households shifting to alternative production methods, including less reliance on mechanization and adoption of solar.
- In central highland areas, the May to June wheat and barley **harvest** and the September millet harvest will slightly improve food availability from May to September. In the northern highlands, the March to April wheat and barley harvest will provide food from own production through around May. In the Arabian coast and eastern plateau, the June to July sorghum and millet harvest will likely provide food stocks lasting up to two months. In the Tihama Plain, the August sorghum harvest will provide food stocks lasting for less than three months.
- The June-September main **fruit and vegetable production season** in the highlands is expected to provide some increased access to income from labor opportunities. In lowland areas, income from labor opportunities will slightly improve during the fruit and vegetable production season from February to May before declining during the June to September agricultural off-season. Overall, income from agricultural labor will likely to be similar to recent years but below pre-crisis levels.
- As is typical, **pasture conditions** are generally expected to improve in the spring with the onset of first rainy season, and are expected to be near average, though localized anomalies are likely. Improved pasture conditions will likely encourage livestock breeders to fatten livestock in preparation to sell at higher prices during Ramadan, and this is expected to provide better food from own production. **Income from livestock sales** will likely be near average levels and will likely increase as is typical during Ramadan and Eid Al-Fitr (February to May) and Eid Al-Adha (June to September) due to seasonally high demand and prices. In lowland areas, lack of pasture availability and high fodder prices from May to July will likely drive poor pastoralist households to sell their livestock at lower prices to cover production costs.
- Harvesting of qat is expected year-round in higher elevation areas. **Qat production** is expected to be near average given prioritization of this cash crop. Real income from qat sales is expected to be near average.
- Given the reported leak from the **Safer FSO vessel**—which carries more than 1.1 million barrels of oil—in December 2021, continued leakage is expected to cause additional damage to the environment and fishing livelihoods. (See “events that might change the outlook” table for discussion of impacts of an explosion.)
- Income from **fishing** will likely remain similar to last year but below pre-conflict levels due mainly to limited access to fishing grounds and rising costs of inputs, including fuel. Income from fishing will likely be at seasonally low levels during the local monsoon seasons (through March along the Red Sea coast, and May to September along the Gulf of Aden coast and Socotra).
- Real **income from casual labor** is expected to remain similar to recent years and below pre-conflict levels due to the impacts of protracted conflict and economic decline on livelihoods and job opportunities.
- Oil production levels in 2022 are expected to be slightly higher than in 2021 but below pre-conflict levels. Given expectations for continued significantly elevated global oil prices, **foreign exchange earnings from oil exports** throughout the projection period are expected to be higher than last year’s high levels but below pre-conflict levels due to reduced production. This will continue providing an important source of government revenue and foreign currency.
- Given expectations for oil revenue, remittances, and sustained humanitarian operations, FEWS NET previously expected that **government revenue and the CBY’s foreign currency reserve levels** would remain sufficient to support the currency auction mechanism for the majority of the projection period but would remain overall similar to last year’s low levels. However, this analysis was conducted in March and assumed that no major financial deposit to support the economy (similar to the two billion USD from the KSA in 2018) would be received during the projection period. Given large financial deposits pledged in early April (2 billion USD by the KSA and 1 billion USD by the UAE), this assumption will be revised in the Food Security Outlook Update forthcoming in April.

- **Income from government salaries and pensions** is expected to remain similar to recent years and below pre-conflict levels. Delays and non-payment are expected to continue, with military and security forces in IRG areas and government employees more broadly in SBA areas likely to continue receiving payments intermittently.
- Traders are expected to continue to access hard currency through the CBY-Aden's open auction mechanism. Given the need to import a significant share of staple goods from alternative suppliers—at higher global prices—due to the impacts of the conflict in Ukraine, **import levels of main staple foods in 2022** will likely be slightly lower than in 2021, with shortages of some commodities possible in the June to September period due to high demand globally. Traders are also expected to increasingly import cheaper and lower quality foods as well as fewer varieties of food commodities due to declining purchasing power among Yemeni consumers.
- Given tensions between SBA and the SLC that are likely to result in continued delays for clearances, levels of **fuel imports through Red Sea ports** will likely remain low, though with month-to-month volatility anticipated. Fuel imports through Aden port are expected to remain relatively stable.
- Periodic **fuel shortages** are likely across the country, with SBA areas worst affected. Households are expected to continue to access fuel mostly from the parallel market, at much higher unofficial prices, which are expected to fluctuate based on changes in supply, official domestic prices, and global prices. Overall, prices will likely continue to increase due to rising global prices. In IRG areas, official fuel prices are expected to increase overall along with global prices, though with fluctuations likely alongside fluctuations in the exchange rate.
- Given expectations for conflict and government revenue, economic conditions are likely to remain poor. FEWS NET previously anticipated that, **in IRG areas, the YER** would continue to lose value against foreign currencies, with the exchange rate in Aden reaching between 1,200 and 1,500 YER/USD by September 2022. The value of the **YER in SBA areas** was expected to remain stable at around 600 YER/USD. However, these projections will be revised in the Food Security Outlook Update forthcoming in April given rising global prices and the large financial deposits pledged in early April (2 billion USD by the KSA and 1 billion USD by the UAE).
- FEWS NET previously projected that **prices of staple wheat flour (imported) in the reference market of Aden** would increase, reaching levels above 900 YER/kg by September 2022, remaining over 50 percent higher than the previous year, due to expectations for currency depreciation (which increases the cost of importation) and higher transportation costs due to rising fuel prices. **In SBA-controlled areas, prices of staple wheat flour (imported)** were expected to increase due to rising fuel prices. However, these projections will be revised in the Food Security Outlook Update forthcoming in April given rising global prices and the large financial deposits pledged in early April (2 billion USD by the KSA and 1 billion USD by the UAE).
- In areas worst affected by price increases and declining purchasing power, an escalation in protests is likely.

#### *Most Likely Food Security Outcomes*

During Ramadan (most of the month of April) and through Eid al-Fitr in early May, cash and food assistance (Zaka'a) will support temporarily improved food consumption for poor households, preventing the food security situation from worsening rapidly during the first half of the projection period. Some households in lowland areas are also expected to continue to experience seasonal improvements in food consumption, supported by stocks from the recent cereal harvest (expected to last through around April/May) and income-earning associated with the main fruit and vegetable production season through May. In northern rural highland areas, the minor cereal harvest will also provide some limited access to food and income through around May. However, given significant increases in prices of food and essential non-food commodities such as fuel, many poor households are likely to face increasingly constrained resources by May.

In the June to September period, food prices are expected to further increase. Additionally, should traders be unable to source sufficient supply of wheat and cooking oil from alternative markets, shortages of imported commodities would be possible in this period, as in-country stocks could be running low by this time. Fuel prices are also likely to further increase due primarily to limited supply and rising global prices, further straining livelihoods and putting further upward pressure on food prices. Given this and, for millions, reduced humanitarian assistance rations, additional households are likely to face consumption gaps or widening consumption gaps during this period. While agricultural activities associated with the main fruit and vegetable production season—and the minor cereal harvest in the central highlands—will provide some support to households in highland areas during this period, households in lowland areas will be experiencing seasonally low levels of food and income during the agricultural off-season.



At the area level, widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are expected to persist throughout the projection period, with additional households likely to deteriorate to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) across the country, particularly in the June to September period. Highest concern exists for those who are market dependent for food in both urban and rural areas and who typically depend on non-diversified and irregular/seasonal income sources (including those primarily dependent on labor wages, some government salaries, and revenue from small businesses) and who are not receiving humanitarian assistance. Also of concern are poor households in lowland areas due to lack of income-earning opportunities in the agricultural off-season from June to September when prices will be highest and when shortages are possible. Worst-affected households—including those with large families who are not receiving or who are receiving insufficient assistance—are likely to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.

*Events that Might Change the Outlook:*

Possible events over the next eight months that could change the most-likely scenario:

Area	Event	Impact on food security outcomes
National	Significant shortages of key staples—including wheat flour and cooking oil—due to the Russia-Ukraine crisis	Reduced staple food availability would result in further food price increases across the country, increasing the number of households facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes due to inability to afford their minimum food needs. In areas where shortages of staple foods occur, many poor households are unlikely to be able to afford substitutes as costs rise, with widening consumption gaps likely for the worst affected.  Area-level deterioration to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) would be possible in areas where food availability is significantly reduced and/or where food prices rise significantly.
National	Further reductions to humanitarian assistance	Access to food would be further reduced in affected areas, with many households unable to compensate through other sources. An increase in the number of households facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes would be likely, with the greatest concern for areas already highly dependent on assistance and/or worst affected by rising food prices.
Marib	Conflict reaches Marib city	Tens or hundreds of thousands of households in Marib would likely be displaced or re-displaced as conflict progresses eastward. While some re-displaced households would likely move back to their original homes in western parts of the governorate, others are likely to move to eastern parts of Marib, Shabwah, and Hadramout. However, it remains possible that conflict restricts movement and prevents households from fleeing to safer areas and from being reached with humanitarian assistance. Should this occur, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes would be likely.  Among many poor households who are not able to flee or who choose to remain in the city and surrounding areas, access to food would likely be further constrained as food prices increase due to the likelihood of some households stockpiling food and due to increased taxes for traders entering Houthi-controlled territory. In the stretch of days after conflict reaches the city, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes would be likely among worst affected households who cannot access markets. There also remains a risk that humanitarian actors would not be able to access the city for a period of around two months, as occurred in Al Hudaydah, which would likely result in widening consumption gaps among worst-affected households.
Red Sea coastal areas	Decaying SAFER oil tanker causes a spill	Although this event is not assessed to be highly likely during the scenario period, the risk of this is increasing over time. Should this occur, destruction of fish and fishing grounds would further damage livelihoods along the Red Sea coast, in addition to more widespread environmental consequences. Households dependent on fishing would be expected to face increasingly constrained food access, with an increasing number expected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes.

## AREAS OF CONCERN

### Lahj Governorate

#### Current Situation

Lahj is well known for its fertile farmland and crop diversity. Nearly half of all households in the governorate are dependent on crop and livestock production, with livestock rearing being the dominant agricultural system. Lahj is well known for producing fruits such as bananas, mangos, and dates, and farmers also grow sorghum and millet. In the highlands, qat and coffee are grown. However, Lahj is known the poorest governorate in IRG-controlled areas of the country. Rates of poverty and chronic food insecurity are high. Most poor households do not own their land. Around a third of households are dependent on casual labor as their primary source of income. An additional third are primarily dependent on government salaries. With cash transfers being the most common modality of humanitarian assistance in the governorate, a significant share (around 20 percent) of households is dependent on humanitarian assistance as their primary source of income. In Al Had, Yafa'a, and Al Maflahy districts, foreign remittances (particularly from the USA, UK, and KSA) are a primary source of income for more than 15-20 percent of households.

The security situation in Lahj governorate has deteriorated since late 2015, particularly in recent past years alongside growing [tension](#) between IRG forces and forces of the Southern Transitional Council. Rising insecurity in late 2021 and early 2022 has further disrupted the livelihoods of many poor households in [Tur Al Bahah](#) and [Al Madaribah Wa Al Arah](#) districts at the western gate of [Bab Al Mundab](#). Households involved in fishing activities also continue to be impacted by insecurity along the western coast. Deteriorating insecurity is also [affecting civilians](#) and traders who must travel through Tur Al Bahah district via the only available road connecting the southern and northern parts of the country. According to data from ACLED, the number of battles and explosions/incidents of remote violence [increased](#) in March 2022 to the highest levels recorded since July/August 2021, though totals in the first quarter of 2022 remained slightly lower than in the same time period of 2021. Levels of population displacement are low in Lahj. As of March 30, 2022, around [204 individuals](#) had been displaced in Lahj since the beginning of the year. An estimated 74 percent of those displaced are assessed to be in need of food and 15 percent are assessed to be in need of shelter, according to IOM. Currently, Lahj is home to around [2,668 displaced households](#) (around 15,895 individuals), of whom 48 percent are living in spontaneous settlements, 31 percent are living in collective centers, and 21 percent are living in camps.

Agricultural livelihoods have been eroded over the years due to the impacts of conflict and poor macroeconomic conditions. Fuel shortages and high prices have caused many farmers to adopt different strategies to mitigate impacts. Many farmers in Tur Al Bahah, Al Musaymir, and Al Qabbaytah have been forced to shift to non-mechanized equipment, increasing labor requirements and resulting in greater post-harvest losses. Moreover, high costs of agricultural inputs and labor along with the long-term impacts of erosion have contributed to a reduction in cultivated land area. As a result, large areas of land are now uncultivated and un-arable, with farmers unable to pay the costs of reclamation to expand cultivation. Furthermore, tomato farmers face significant losses each year due to the absence of proper marketing systems and government production management policies.

In lowland areas, the January to March harvest of millet and maize has concluded, providing some households with limited food from own production and income from crop sales. However, due to limited local production and high production costs of locally produced cereals, most households rely on market purchases of relatively cheaper imported cereals. In March 2022, prices of locally produced sorghum, maize, and millet were above 1000 YER/kg, while prices of imported wheat grains and flour were lower, at 792 YER/kg and 825 YER/kg, respectively, according to data from [FAO](#).


Food prices in Lahj are heavily dependent on factors that affect internal trading, including local currency depreciation, transportation costs, assistance distribution, and local production. Currency depreciation continues to impact Lahj alongside other IRG-controlled areas. From February to March 2022, the local currency in Lahj depreciated against the USD by 13 percent, reaching value 41 percent lower than the same time last year and 482 percent lower than pre-crisis levels (February 2015). Additionally, rising [fuel prices](#) have significantly increased transportation costs in recent years and months, and political tensions between the different warring parties have led to increases in [unofficial tariffs at checkpoints](#), putting additional upward pressure on prices. Meanwhile commercial fuel stations manipulate prices, and political tensions also result in fuel trucks being held at [checkpoints](#). In March 2022, official prices of petrol and diesel were 23 and 30 percent higher, respectively, than the previous month, reaching levels 121 percent and 110 percent higher, respectively, than the same time last year according to data from [FAO](#).

In March 2022, the cost of the MFB averaged 104,067 YER across Lahj, a full 12 percent higher than the previous month and 56 percent higher than the same time last year, according to data from FAO. Prices of staple wheat flour averaged 825 YER/kg, a full 72 percent higher than the same time last year. For wage laborers and pastoralists who sell livestock to earn income, inflation has also increased the nominal value of these key income sources. According to data from FAO, agricultural and unskilled labor wages in March 2022 were 72 percent and 61 percent higher, respectively, than the same time last year, while the cost of a one-year-old sheep was 50 percent higher than the same time last year. Given this, the amount of staple wheat flour an unskilled laborer could buy from one day's work at prevailing wage rates and prices was 5 percent higher in March 2022 than the same time last year, while this amount was 12 percent higher for agricultural labors. Meanwhile, the amount of wheat flour a pastoralist could buy from selling one sheep was 3 percent lower than the same time last year. However, purchasing power by this measure is volatile in Lahj and is currently below average after declining overall since 2016 and, even more recently, declining from relatively high levels in mid-2020 (Figure 4). This measure of purchasing power also does not take into account demand for labor and livestock, which has likely declined overall as rising prices have limited purchasing power of those who would hire labor and buy livestock and meat. To cover the cost of the MFB at March 2022 prices, agricultural wage laborers would need to work for sixteen full days of the month, while unskilled wage laborers would need to work for nine days. This is expected to be infeasible for many households given significant economic decline. According to key informants, currency depreciation and high fuel prices have forced some small businesses (including small workshops, private fuel stations, and brick factories) to shut down. Some factories have also shut down or reduced their production due to high costs of industrial inputs including power and raw materials, leading to layoffs. This is increasing competition for available income-earning opportunities which are becoming more limited.

Over 60 percent of households in Lahj receive monthly emergency humanitarian food assistance, according to data from FSAC. In January 2022, 656,411 individuals were reached with assistance (Figure 5). Of these, 88 percent received cash transfers, 10 percent received commodity vouchers, and only 2 percent received in-kind food. Though beneficiaries in Lahj continue to receive full rations, equivalent to around 80 percent of households' energy needs, the value of cash transfers is not adjusted frequently enough to keep up with rapidly rising food prices. Across the governorate, humanitarian assistance is among the main sources of income for many poor households. Al Maqatirah and Al Qabbaytah districts are particularly reliant on assistance.


According to a nutrition SMART survey conducted in November and December 2021 by UNICEF and government partners, prevalence of GAM among children under five as measured by WHZ was 14.3 percent in lowland areas, on the border of a

**Figure 4.** Purchasing power for laborers and pastoralists in Lahj as measured by the terms of trade (TOT); amount of imported wheat flour (kg) that can be purchased from one day's work or the sale of one sheep, April 2016 to March 2022



Source: FEWS NET using data from FAO

**Figure 5.** Number of beneficiaries targeted with emergency food assistance by FSAC partners in January 2022



Source: FEWS NET using data from FSAC

“Serious” (10-14.9 percent prevalence; aligned with IPC Phase 3) and “Critical” (15-29.9 percent prevalence; aligned with IPC Phase 4) situation according to IPC thresholds. In highland areas, GAM prevalence was 6.2 percent, within “Alert” levels (5-9.9 percent prevalence; aligned with IPC Phase 2) according to IPC thresholds. In the previous SMART survey conducted in October 2019, GAM prevalence was estimated at 19.8 percent in lowland areas and 9.7 percent in highland areas. However, GAM prevalence remains high, particularly in lowland areas. Similar to other parts of the country, rates of malnutrition are higher in the lowlands due to poverty and very limited access to land and income sources.

Economic decline continues to reduce availability of income-earning opportunities for populations with already high rates of poverty and chronic food insecurity. Livelihoods are deteriorating due to rising prices of fuel and escalating insecurity in some areas. Currently, food from the recent cereal harvest is likely supporting some rural households, though many poor households are landless. Income from the fruit and vegetable production season is providing access to income for some, though availability of income-earning opportunities has likely declined overall. Households with non-diversified and irregular income sources including from [wage labor](#) and government salaries are likely worst affected by rising prices. Moreover, spread of [human diseases](#) in winter (late January to February) is expected to be further straining households’ available income due to increased medical costs, particularly in Al Madaribah Wa Al Arah district. Full rations of humanitarian assistance are likely preventing a significant share of the population from facing consumption gaps or wider consumption gaps, though some households likely use cash benefits for non-food purposes including to cover rising costs of living expenses or to pay debts. With coping capacity already eroded for most poor households, many households are expected to be facing food consumption gaps and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes, especially in lowland areas and in areas impacted by conflict and high poverty rates, including Tur Al Bahah, Al Qabbaytah, Al Musaymir, and Al Maqatirah districts. At the area level, Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are expected, supported by significant food assistance. Worst-affected households—including poor households who are not receiving assistance or who are using it for non-food purposes—are likely facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.

#### *Assumptions*

In addition to the national assumptions listed above, the most likely scenario for Lahj for March to September 2022 is based on the following assumptions:

- FEWS NET previously anticipated that the **exchange rate** in Lahj would depreciate to reach levels between 1,300 and 1,500 YER/USD by September 2022. However, these projections will be revised in the Food Security Outlook Update forthcoming in April given rising global prices and the large financial deposits pledged in early April (2 billion USD by the KSA and 1 billion USD by the UAE). The exchange rate in Lahj is anticipated to remain slightly higher than in Aden.
- FEWS NET previously projected that **prices of staple wheat flour (imported)** would remain increase, reaching an average of 1,100 YER/kg by September 2022, significantly above last year and average levels. However, these projections will be revised in the Food Security Outlook Update forthcoming in April given rising global prices and the large financial deposits pledged in early April (2 billion USD by the KSA and 1 billion USD by the UAE).
- Income from **cross-border remittances** is expected to seasonally increase during the month of Ramadan (mostly April) but will then reduce and will likely remain below pre-COVID levels during the projection period due to restrictive labor policies and declining purchasing power affecting Yemenis in the KSA. Households in Al Had, Yafa’a, and Al Maflahy districts will be most affected by this.
- Income from **agricultural labor** will likely remain at seasonally high levels in the first half of the projection period due to the mango harvest. In the June to September period, food and income from agricultural labor will be at seasonally low levels during the agricultural off-season.
- Income from livestock production and sales will be at seasonally high levels in April and May due to high demand during Ramadan and Eid. Purchasing power for pastoralists is expected to remain similar to or lower than last year, below five-year average levels, and significantly below pre-crisis levels.
- Emergency humanitarian food assistance is expected to continue at current levels.

#### *Most Likely Food Security Outcomes*

During Ramadan (most of the month of April) and through Eid al-Fitr in early May, cash and food assistance (Zaka’a) will support temporarily improved food consumption for poor households. For farming households—particularly in Al Milah and Al Musaymir districts where many households grow cereals for own consumption—stocks from the January to March cereal harvest (expected to last at least two months) will also increase food availability through around May, while fruit and vegetable



production will provide some income-earning opportunities during this period. However, rising prices of food and essential non-food commodities including fuel will continue to strain livelihoods and reduce household purchasing power.

In the June to September period, more rural households will likely have exhausted food stocks and will become increasingly reliant on markets as food prices continue to increase. At the same time, access to income will reduce further with the agricultural off-season. As food becomes increasingly unaffordable, additional households will likely engage in extreme coping strategies such as eating leftover food scraps from restaurants.

Overall, given expectations for rising prices and limited access to income, food is likely to remain too expensive for many poor households, with an increasing number expected to face food consumption gaps in the second half of the projection period. Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes expected to persist at the area level, with additional households expected to deteriorate to Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

**Taizz Governorate**

*Current Situation*

Located in the southwest along the Red Sea coast, Taizz is one of the most populated governorates in Yemen. The economy is relatively diversified compared to other governorates, though conflict has significantly reduced economic and business activity. Agriculture, livestock production, and, in coastal areas, fishing, are key economic activities. Various industrial, mining, and artisan activities also employ a segment of the local workforce. Cereals (sorghum, barley, wheat, millet), pulses, fruits, and vegetables are the main crops cultivated for own consumption, while fruits, vegetables, and barley are also produced for sale. Livestock rearing provides both food and income to households. However, even with some crop and livestock production, most households depend heavily on markets to source most of their food.

Most of Taizz governorate is controlled by IRG forces, though SBA forces control Mawiyah, Shara’b As Salam, Shara’b Ar Rawnah, Dimnat Khadir, Hayfan, At Ta’iziyah, Sama, and parts of As Silw, Salh, and Dabir Al Mawadim districts. In 2021, Taizz recorded the third highest number of conflict-related incidents of all governorates of Yemen. The frontlines of conflict in Taizz are mostly static despite years of ongoing fighting, with conflict concentrated in Taizz city and surrounding districts (Figure 6).

From January 1 to March 23, 2022, an estimated 4,164 individuals were newly displaced in Taizz, according to data from IOM. Though this number is significant, it is 29 percent lower than in the same period of 2021. Of those displaced in 2022, 67 percent expected to be in need of financial support and 31 percent are expected to be in need of food, according to IOM. Taizz is currently expected to be hosting an estimated 7,492 households (around 38,452 individuals), of whom 63 percent are living in spontaneous settlements, 21 percent are living in urban locations, and only around 8 percent are living in camps.

In IRG areas of Taizz, the local currency typically follows the same trend as in Aden and has generally been depreciating over time, driving rising prices of food and essential non-food commodities. In SBA areas of Taizz, the exchange rate has remained generally stable at a rate similar to other SBA areas. However, rising fuel prices (Figure 7) are straining livelihoods and putting upward pressure on prices of food and essential non-food commodities in both SBA and IRG areas of Taizz. In SBA-controlled areas, severe fuel shortages were reported in late February due to continued shortages of official fuel in Sana’a. In IRG-controlled areas, fuel should be sold at the area-wide rate established by the Yemen Petroleum Corporation (YPC), though is in fact sold at higher prices due to additional operational and transportation costs.

On average across Taizz markets, the cost of the MFB in January 2022 (the most recent month of available data) was 52 percent higher than the same time last year. Food prices are generally higher in main markets in IRG-controlled areas of Taizz (Beer Basha, Central Taiz, and Maqbanah) relative to markets in SBA-controlled areas due to depreciation of the currency. Prices in IRG-controlled markets are also generally higher than prices in Aden, due primarily to transportation costs. Due to conflict, traders are forced to take longer travel routes, driving up prices of food and non-food commodities. In late 2021, prices of wheat flour in IRG-controlled markets of Taizz were 7-14 percent higher than prices in Aden.

**Figure 6.** Location of incidents of armed clashes, shelling, and airstrikes in Taizz, January to March 2022



Source: *Intelyse*



In lowland areas of the governorate (Tihama Plain), harvesting of winter cereals is ongoing. However, due to small landholdings, reductions in cultivated land area driven by high production costs, and a preference for cultivating cash crops over food crops, agricultural production contributes little to households' total food needs.

Casual labor (agricultural and non-agricultural) is an important source of income for many poor households in Taizz. More than half of the governorate's population depends on casual labor as their primary source of income. Government salary and pension payments are a primary source of income for many others. However, all of these sources of income are

irregular, leaving households vulnerable to disruptions. With the start of land preparation activities in the highlands and the end of land preparation activities for sorghum in the lowlands in March, agriculture wage rates increased by 7 percent from February to March 2022, while unskilled wage rates remained generally stable, according to data from [FAO](#). Additionally, qat production and marketing provides poor households with some income throughout the production and marketing chain year-round, but at lower levels during winter.


At January 2022 wage rates and prices, agricultural and unskilled wage laborers working five full days in the month could afford only 43 and 44 percent, respectively, of the cost of the MFB, while laborers working for 10 days could afford 85 and 88 percent, respectively. To cover the full cost of the MFB, laborers would need to work for more than two weeks, which is expected to be very difficult due to lack of job opportunities and increased competition for available opportunities.

Around 60 percent of the population of Taizz receives monthly emergency humanitarian food assistance distributions. In January 2022, 1.9 million people were reached with emergency food assistance according to data from FSAC. Of these, 70 percent received in-kind food, 28 percent received commodity vouchers, and less than 2 percent received cash transfers. Beneficiaries of all modalities have been receiving 30 percent reduced rations since December 2021, with current assistance levels expected to cover 50-60 percent of beneficiary household's caloric needs. Access constraints due to active conflict remain a major obstacle to humanitarian partners, particularly in the governorate's hard-to-reach districts including Maqbanah. From August to December 2021, assistance coverage was relatively lower in the districts of Maqbanah, Al Ma'afer, and Ash Shamayatayn, and was also relatively lower in Al Wazi'iyah in December. According to data from FSAC, the districts of Salah, Maqbanah, Al Mokha, and Jabal Habashy included the highest numbers of unassisted households at displacement sites.

According to a nutrition SMART survey conducted by UNICEF and government partners in November and December 2021, the prevalence of GAM among children under five as measured by WHZ was 24 percent in lowland areas, well above the WHO emergency level of 15 percent and a "Critical" situation (15-29.9 percent prevalence; aligned with IPC Phase 4) according to IPC thresholds. In Taizz city, GAM prevalence was 14.1 percent, on the border of a "Serious" (10-14.9 percent prevalence; aligned with IPC Phase 3) and "Critical" (15-29.9 percent prevalence; aligned with IPC Phase 4) situation according to IPC thresholds. In highland areas, GAM prevalence was 10.6 percent, on the border of "Alert" levels (5-9.9 percent prevalence; aligned with IPC Phase 2) and "Serious" levels (10-14.9 percent prevalence; aligned with IPC Phase 3) according to IPC thresholds. Compared the previous SMART survey conducted in 2019, GAM prevalence increased slightly in Taizz lowland and decreased slightly in Taizz city and Taizz highland.

As many poor households have likely already exhausted available coping strategies, a growing number are likely experiencing consumption gaps and Crisis (IPC Phase) or Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes following recent price increases and reductions to humanitarian assistance rations. Households who have recently experienced reductions in assistance rations and who typically depend on assistance as a primary food source are expected to be among the worst affected. At the area level, Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are expected in the presence of significant humanitarian assistance.

Figure 7. Average prices of fuel in Taizz markets, June 2016 to January 2022



Source: FAO

### *Assumptions*

In addition to the national assumptions listed above, the most likely scenario for Taizz for March to September 2022 is based on the following assumptions:

- Conflict is expected to continue at current levels.
- Periodic fuel shortages are likely across the governorate, with districts under SBA control worst affected.
- In lowland areas (Tihama Plain), access to income from agricultural labor is expected to seasonally improve in the first half of the projection period with the peak fruit and vegetable harvest. In highland areas, land preparation, agricultural operations, and the April/May cereal harvest will provide some increased access to income and food during the first half of the projection period. The fruit and vegetable production season will also slightly improve access to income for poor households throughout the production and marketing chain during this time. Meanwhile, in the second half of the projection period, qat and vegetables production will increase demand for agricultural and non-agricultural labor and associated income for poor households.
- Wages are expected to increase but are not expected to keep up with inflation. Purchasing power for poor households is expected to decline.
- Emergency humanitarian food assistance is expected to continue at current levels.

### *Most Likely Food Security Outcomes*

Throughout the projection period, rising prices of food and essential non-food commodities are expected to increasingly constrain poor households' available resources, with labor wages and other sources of income unlikely to keep up with inflation.


During Ramadan (most of the month of April) and through Eid al-Fitr in early May, cash and food assistance (Zaka'a) will support temporarily improved food consumption for poor households. At the same time, higher prices of fish and livestock due to higher demand during Ramadan and Eid al-Fitr (mid-May) will likely provide increased access to income from sales during this period. However, in the second half of May, poor households will likely again begin to face inability to meet their basic needs given very high food prices, limited income earning opportunities, and sustained lower levels of humanitarian assistance. Many are likely to increasingly face food consumption gaps and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes. At the area level, Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are expected to persist, with significant humanitarian assistance preventing worse outcomes.

In the June to September period, declining purchasing power among those who hire labor will also likely further constrain available income-earning opportunities as food prices continue to rise. Additional households are expected to face widening food consumption gaps or engage in severe coping strategies such as marrying underage daughters or sending sons to join armed groups. Though area-level Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are expected to persist, a growing number will likely face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.

**MOST LIKELY FOOD SECURITY OUTCOMES AND AREAS RECEIVING SIGNIFICANT LEVELS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE\***


Each of these maps adheres to IPC v3.0 humanitarian assistance mapping protocols and flags where significant levels of humanitarian assistance are being/are expected to be provided. 🍲 indicates that at least 25 percent of households receive on average 25–50 percent of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance (HFA). 🍲 indicates that at least 25 percent of households receive on average over 50 percent of caloric needs through HFA. This mapping protocol differs from the (!) protocol used in the maps at the top of the report. The use of (!) indicates areas that would likely be at least one phase worse in the absence of current or programmed humanitarian assistance.

Current, March 2022




Source: FEWS NET

Projected food security outcomes, March to May 2022



Source: FEWS NET

Projected food security outcomes, June to September 2022



Source: FEWS NET

FEWS NET classification is IPC-compatible. IPC-compatible analysis follows key IPC protocols but does not necessarily reflect the consensus of national food security partners.

FEWS NET. Yemen Food Security Outlook, March to September 2022. Food prices rise rapidly following Russian invasion of Ukraine. March 2022.

**ABOUT SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT**

To project food security outcomes, FEWS NET develops a set of assumptions about likely events, their effects, and the probable responses of various actors. FEWS NET analyzes these assumptions in the context of current conditions and local livelihoods to arrive at a most likely scenario for the coming eight months. [Learn more here.](#)