



World Food Programme

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# YEMEN FOOD SECURITY QUARTERLY REVIEW Q2-2022





## Key messages

- The truce - in effect since early April - resulted in much needed improved fuel supply and decreased armed clashes across the country during Q2-2022.
- Reduced levels of food assistance in Q2-2022 and high local food prices continue to drive severe food insecurity.
- High levels of global food and fuel prices and supply concerns as outcome of Ukraine-Russia conflict continue to negatively impact food systems in Yemen.

## Summary

**Food insecurity:** Despite the truce, households in Yemen witnessed the worst food consumption gaps since 2018 and are facing more hardship in coping with food shortages than at any other point of time in the last three years. Half of all surveyed households reported lacking access to adequate food. Poor food consumption and the level of food-based coping strategies applied by households peaked during June. Key drivers are the impact of the ongoing macroeconomic crisis on households' purchasing power, the continued reduction in humanitarian assistance and the elevated levels of food prices.

**Humanitarian food assistance:** Throughout 2022, WFP was compelled to reduce food rations, particularly in the fourth cycle, due to continued funding shortfalls, limited food stocks and logistics constraints. WFP started prioritising eight million people with reduced rations, while five million people in areas with highest needs received higher rations in each distribution cycle. By end-June, the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan for Yemen was only 26 percent funded.

**Conflict:** The warring parties in Yemen agreed to the United Nations' proposal of committing to a truce as of 2nd of April. As a result, Q2-2022 saw the second lowest quarterly civilian casualty count in the country since 2018. On the other hand, the Q2-2022 recorded the highest quarterly casualty count due to landmines and unexploded ordinance. This was largely because of the increased freedom of movement for people in areas where fighting had de-escalated, but that were not cleared of explosive remnants of warfare.

**Exchange rate:** In IRG-controlled areas, the riyal appreciated 34 percent in the immediate aftermath of the truce announcement as the market anticipated a two billion dollars deposit to the Central Bank of Yemen. As

the deposit continued to delay, the riyal depreciated by 19 percent to reach YER 1,115/USD 1 by the end of June. In areas under Sana'a-based authorities, the currency appreciated by eight percent, reaching YER 557 to the dollar by the end of Q2-2022.

**Fuel imports:** Fuel supply significantly improved as the truce facilitated fuel ships to enter into Red Sea ports since April 2022. Consequently, in Q2-2022 the volume of fuel imports through northern ports superseded the volume of 2021.

**Food imports:** During the first half of 2022, food imports through Aden port decreased by 42 percent compared to last year. This is in part attributable to the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine and thus changes in sources and costs of food on the global market, the reduction of humanitarian food assistance, and high port handling and shipping charges diminishing importers' margins. Meanwhile, the volume of food imports increased by 17 percent in the northern ports.

**Global food and fuel prices:** After reaching an all-time high in March 2022, the FAO Food Price Index remained at an elevated level throughout Q2-2022. At the same time, global fertilizer prices increased by nearly 30 percent compared to last year, while June marked the highest prices of global crude oil in the past ten years.

**Fuel prices:** In areas under IRG, the pump prices<sup>1</sup> of petrol and diesel decreased by 15 percent and five percent respectively compared to Q1-2022, however remaining twice as high as the year before. In areas under Sana'a-based authorities, parallel market prices decreased by 45 percent for petrol and by 31 percent for diesel compared to the last quarter, while pump prices remained stable. This is largely attributed to the improved fuel supply following the truce.

**Minimum food basket:** The average cost of the MFB slightly decreased by six percent compared to Q1-2022 in IRG-controlled areas. Worryingly, it remained 77 percent above the level in 2021 when vulnerable households were already facing hardship in affording an adequate diet. At the same time, the cost of the MFB in areas under Sana'a-based authorities reached an all-time high of YER 8,891 per person per month in June 2022 after an increase of 13 percent during the first half of 2022 and of 38 percent compared to the previous year.

<sup>1</sup> Pumping fuel price: the average of official price and commercial price of fuel sold through the gas stations

## Key drivers of food insecurity

Continued macroeconomic crisis, insufficient funding for life-saving humanitarian food assistance and increasing local food prices were the key drivers of the four-year high food insecurity levels. Elevated global food and fuel prices further exacerbated Yemen's economic crisis in 2022. These are largely driven by the consequences of the Ukraine-Russia conflict on the global availability and prices of essential food items including wheat and cooking oil.

Meanwhile, the agreed truce in April has brought some relief to the Yemeni population including a significant reduction in civilian casualties and improved fuel supply into the country. Furthermore, it constitutes an opening of a possibility of political settlement in Yemen.

### Conflict

After more than seven years of conflict, the parties in Yemen agreed to the United Nations' proposal of holding a two-month truce as of 2nd of April<sup>2</sup>, representing the first countrywide truce since 2016. The agreement includes a cessation of offensive military operations inside Yemen and across its border, facilitation of the entry of fuel ships to Al Hodeidah port and opening of commercial flights to and from Sana'a airport. The parties also agreed to further negotiate on opening roads in Ta'iz and other governorates to facilitate the freedom of movement for people inside Yemen and improve their access to vital facilities.

In June, the truce was extended for two additional months under the same terms as the original agreement. Continued commitment to the truce could improve the situation of the Yemeni population and pave the way to build more confidence between the warring parties to address the economic and security challenges, ultimately aiming to move towards political settlement to end all conflict across the country.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the parties to the conflict have signed an action plan with the United Nations to commit to preventing the recruitment of children in armed conflict alongside other human rights violations, such as targeting of schools and hospitals.<sup>4</sup>

As a result of the truce, the second lowest civilian casualty count since 2018 was recorded in Q2-2022 with 457 civilians killed/injured and no reports of civilian airstrike casualties (down from 1,095 and 467 respectively during Q1-2022)<sup>5</sup>. Furthermore, violence impacting infrastructure and vital services markedly decreased with no reports of clashes impacting education, fuel or telecommunications facilities. Also, the number of incidents to impact healthcare facilities dropped from ten in the first quarter to two during the second quarter of 2022.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>2</sup> UN, Apr 2022

<sup>3</sup> OSESGY, Jul 2022

<sup>4</sup> UN, Apr 2022

<sup>5</sup> CIMP, Jul 2022


<sup>6</sup> Ibid

The de-escalation of hostilities also led to a notable decrease in the level of displacement. IOM estimates that approximately 12,300 people in Yemen were displaced at least once during Q2-2022,<sup>7</sup> mainly in Al Hodeidah and Ma'rib governorates, which is less than half of the level recorded during the previous quarter. Reportedly, displacement during Q2-2022 was mainly driven by hardship due to lack of job opportunities and adequate food<sup>8</sup> as well as clashes in some areas.

However, despite the overall improvement, violations including shelling, drone attacks, reconnaissance overflights, and redeployments of forces were observed.<sup>9</sup> Armed clashes were reported on several frontlines especially in Ma'rib, Ta'iz, and Al Hodeidah governorates. Moreover, Q2-2022 marked the highest quarterly casualty count from unexploded ordnances, which is caused by increased movement to previously inaccessible areas with high volumes of landmines.

### Exchange rate

The prolonged conflict continues to challenge the macroeconomic environment in Yemen, largely due to conflicting fiscal policies, fragmentation of national institutions, shortages in foreign currency reserves, severely stressed public finances and continued monetization of the fiscal deficit<sup>10</sup>.



<sup>7</sup> IOM, Jul 2022

<sup>8</sup> OCHA, Jun 2022

<sup>9</sup> OSESGY, Jun 2022

<sup>10</sup> The World Bank, Apr 2022

Following the truce, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced a new economic support package of two billion US dollars to the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) in an attempt to stabilize the currency across IRG-controlled areas. Despite the non-materialisation of the actual deposit, the exchange rate reacted by appreciating 34 percent during the first two weeks of April, highlighting the largely speculative and volatile currency market in the south. Thereafter, the exchange rate depreciated by 19 percent to reach YER 1,115 per US dollar by end-June.

The World Bank estimates a concerning increase in Yemen's current account deficit from 4.7 percent to 12.3 percent of GDP between 2021 and 2022. On top of this, the Bank forecasts the IRG to face additional fiscal pressure due to the suspension of international debt-relief initiatives. This highlights the criticality of the KSA/UAE economic support package in order to avoid a large widening of the financing gap and a sharp drop in the international reserve levels.<sup>11</sup>

Initiated in late 2021 with the purpose of stabilizing the currency in IRG-controlled areas, the CBY Aden continued auctioning foreign currencies to relieve the pressure on the rial.<sup>12</sup> On 16 May, the final USD 174 million of a KSA deposit promised in 2018 was transferred to CBY Aden.<sup>13</sup> Following this, the amount of foreign currency auctioned in late-May was increased from 20 million to 30 million dollars<sup>14</sup> to cover the increased need for hard currency for imports<sup>15</sup>.


After having been stable at around YER 600 to the dollar since January 2020, the exchange rate appreciated by eight percent to reach YER 557 in areas under Sana'a-based authorities.

## Fuel imports

Following the truce, fuel ships were able to enter into Red Sea ports since April. As a result, the total fuel import via ports of Al Hodeidah and Saleef during Q2-2022 was five-fold the level of Q1-2022 and more than the total fuel imports during the entire 2021.<sup>16</sup> The increased availability of fuel largely relieved the pressure on essential public services such as clean water, healthcare, electricity and transportation.<sup>17</sup> Queues at petrol stations significantly shortened, positively affecting people's mobility.<sup>18</sup>

On the other hand, fuel imports through the southern ports of Aden and Mukalla decreased by around 62 percent compared to Q1-2022, as Aden and Mukalla ports no longer needed to compensate for the lack of fuel imported via Al Hodeidah port during the restriction period between June 2020 and March 2022.

## Fuel imports through Red Sea ports



## Fuel prices

Exacerbating the price increases that started in 2021, the Ukraine-Russia conflict is resulting in supply disruptions in the global energy markets as Russia is among the top three crude oil producing countries globally.<sup>19</sup> Consequently, global prices of crude oil reached a ten-year high in June after increasing around 17 percent since April and by almost 68 percent since June 2021.<sup>20</sup> As Yemen is highly dependent on fuel imports, this is increasing the pressure on the balance of payments.<sup>21</sup>

Despite the increasing global prices, the improvements in fuel import kept fuel prices below the level of Q1-2022. Consequently, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen has stressed that it is more important than ever to ensure a smooth flow of fuel into the country to ensure essential services and avoid price increases.<sup>22</sup>

In areas under IRG, the average pump prices of petrol and diesel<sup>23</sup> decreased by 15 percent and five percent respectively compared to Q1-2022, while parallel market prices decreased by one percent for petrol and 12 percent for diesel.

<sup>11</sup> The World Bank, 2022

<sup>15</sup> FEWSNET, May 2022

<sup>12</sup> FEWSNET, Dec 2021

<sup>16</sup> UNWIM, Jul 2022

<sup>13</sup> CBY Yemen, May 2022

<sup>17</sup> UN, Jul 2022

<sup>14</sup> CBY Yemen, May 2022

<sup>18</sup> UN, Jun 2022

<sup>19</sup> International Energy Agency, Jul 2022

<sup>20</sup> US Energy Information Administration, Jul 2022

<sup>21</sup> IMF, Jun 2022

<sup>22</sup> OSESGY, Jul 2022

<sup>23</sup> Pumping fuel price: the average of official price and commercial price of fuel sold through the gas stations




However, both official and parallel market fuel prices in the south remained more than double of the 2021-prices.

Following record-high parallel market prices in Q1-2022 due to severe shortages, areas under Sana'a-based authorities saw prices decreasing by 45 percent for petrol and by 31 percent for diesel in Q2-2022. As a result, the gap between the pump prices and prices in the parallel market decreased from 147 percent in early March to 11 percent in early June for petrol and from 102 percent to 12 percent for diesel.


**Petrol prices**

**Diesel prices**



and, at much smaller scale, the reduction of humanitarian food assistance. Food aid imports through Aden during the first half of 2022 were nearly 65 percent lower than during the same period in 2021. Reportedly, also the high port handling and shipping charges resulted in importers decreasing the number of containers and relying on other ports<sup>24</sup> as a reaction to diminishing their margins. Close monitoring of food imports is warranted to detect longer-term ramifications of supply side shocks.

**Food imports through Red Sea ports**



**Food imports**

Yemen is one of the world’s most food import-dependent countries with import accounting for around 90 percent of its total food supply.

The volume of food imports through Aden port (376 thousand mt) slightly increased by four percent compared to Q1-2022. However, imports in 2022 are 42 percent below the first half of 2021. This is in part attributable to the ripple effects of the war in the Ukraine and thus changes in sources and costs of food on the global market, the higher proximity of Red Sea ports to end customers

The total volume of food imports discharged via Al Hodeidah and Saleef ports (1,158 thousand mt) increased by three percent compared to the previous quarter. Meanwhile, it remained 17 percent higher during the first half of 2022 than the same period last year.

Historically, Ukraine and Russia are among the world’s most important agricultural commodity exporters and accountable for nearly 12 percent of food calories traded globally<sup>25</sup>. Russia has been the world’s largest exporter of wheat and an essential global supplier of fertilizers, while Ukraine was a key exporter of wheat and sunflower seed oil.<sup>26</sup> However, conflict-related export restrictions have already

<sup>24</sup> Yemen Today, Aug 2022


<sup>25</sup> IEPRI, Feb 2022

<sup>26</sup> The World Bank, May 2022

impacted both countries, leaving Yemen in a vulnerable position as it depends on Ukrainian and Russian wheat supply for nearly 45 percent of its total wheat imports.<sup>27</sup> Furthermore, as an increasing number of global importers search for new source markets for wheat,<sup>28</sup> this has been affecting the availability and affordability of wheat from other key exporting countries.

Yemeni wheat reserves in IRG areas are expected to last until mid-October 2022.<sup>29</sup> According to a recent ACAPS report, traders in SBA areas as of July did not see any indication of wheat supply shortages.<sup>30</sup> Increasing strategic food reserves in Yemen remains a challenge because of the limited storage capacity of existing grain silos at Aden and Al Hodeidah ports, which - as reported by FEWSNET - is not exceeding 20 percent of the total annual consumption requirements.<sup>31</sup>

↓ Food imports through Aden Port




### Global food prices

The FAO Food Price Index reached its all-time high value in March 2022 and remained at a similar high level throughout Q2-2022.<sup>32</sup> By June 2022, the index was 23 percent above the previous year which was driven by an increase in all food subindices, particularly vegetable oils (up by 34 percent), cereals (28 percent) and dairy products (25 percent).

This increase is exacerbated by the increase in global prices of fertilizers, both being highly correlated in the long run.<sup>33</sup> In June 2022, global fertilizer prices had grown by nearly 30 percent since the previous year.<sup>34</sup> These are likely to continue to negatively impact the global agricultural sector and commodity market as they are expected to remain at elevated levels throughout 2022.<sup>35</sup>

According to the World Bank, the emerging global food crisis driven by the Ukraine-Russia conflict and the lagged effects of the COVID-19 pandemic could result in soaring global food prices until the end of 2024,<sup>36</sup> potentially leading to a global food crisis similar to or worse than the one faced in 2007-2008.<sup>37</sup>

↑ Global food price index (FFPI)



<sup>27</sup> Centre for Strategic and International Studies, May 2022  
<sup>28</sup> The World Bank, 2022  
<sup>29</sup> Reuters, Aug 2022  
<sup>30</sup> ACAPS, Aug 2022: Global wheat supply dynamics and their impact  
<sup>31</sup> FEWS.NET, May 2022  
<sup>32</sup> FAO, Jul 2022

<sup>33</sup> IFPRI, Apr 2022  
<sup>34</sup> Index Mundi, Jul 2022  
<sup>35</sup> USDA, Jun 2022  
<sup>36</sup> The World Bank, Aug 2022  
<sup>37</sup> European Parliament, 2022  
<sup>38</sup> The World Bank, 2022



### Volume of humanitarian food assistance

The Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022 highlights that around 23.4 million Yemenis need humanitarian assistance.<sup>39</sup> Of these, nearly 17.4 million people were facing acute food insecurity during January-May 2022, increasing to 19 million people during June-December 2022.<sup>40</sup>

As of 30 June, only 26 percent of the funding needed according to the Humanitarian Response Plan 2022 had been committed. As a result, 26 out of the 41 major UN programmes in Yemen have been scaled back or closed with a risk that an additional 15 programmes can be impacted in the coming months.<sup>41</sup>

Severe funding shortfalls, limited food stocks and logistics constraints such as the fuel crisis affected the volume and regularity of food assistance negatively in Q2-2022. Throughout 2022, food rations have been reducing, particularly in the fourth cycle, affecting beneficiaries in all regions. While keeping the planned number of beneficiaries at 13 million, as of January 2022, WFP changed from distributing monthly rations to distributing in cycles, the completion of which requires more than one month. Eight million people were targeted with reduced

rations in each distribution cycle, while five million people living in the areas reflecting the highest levels of food insecurity received higher rations.


Consequently, WFP beneficiary monitoring reflects increasing levels of food insecurity in Yemen, which are likely to further deteriorate should funding levels for humanitarian assistance and contextual factors not improve.

### Food inflation based on minimum food basket<sup>42</sup>


#### MFB in areas under control of the IRG

Until the first week of May 2022, currency appreciation following the anticipation of the KSA/UAE deposit at CBY Aden led the MFB price to decrease. However, as the exchange rate started depreciating again, the cost of MFB returned during June 2022 to the 2021 peak and slightly below the all-time high level of March 2022; it cost YER 16,125/person/month. Overall, the monthly average cost of the MFB slightly decreased by six percent compared to Q1-2022. However, the price was 77 percent above the level recorded a year before and almost seven times its pre-crisis level.

Level of humanitarian food assistance



The cost of the minimum food basket (MFB)





<sup>39</sup> HNO 2022

<sup>40</sup> IPC 2022

<sup>41</sup> Humanitarian Update, Jun 2022

<sup>42</sup> The minimum food basket includes 10.71 kg wheat flour, 1.43 kg red beans, 1.14 L vegetable oil, 0.36 kg sugar and 0.14 kg salt per person per month



The annual increase is even more evident in Shabwah, Ta'iz and Ad Dali' where the cost almost doubled since June 2021. This is particularly concerning as Ad Dali' is projected to have populations facing Catastrophe food security outcomes (IPC Phase 5) during the second half of 2022.<sup>43</sup> Such doubling of prices hampers people's ability to meet minimum food and other essential needs. According to mVAM data, 28 percent of surveyed households indicated high food prices as the main challenge to access adequate food in Q2-2022.

Global food prices and exchange rate movements are a key driving factor for food price developments in IRG areas with YER/USD depreciation reflecting immediate price increases, while appreciation tends to be affiliated with a lagged effect on price decreases.

### MFB in areas under control of the Sana'a-based authorities

In June 2022, the monthly average cost of a MFB reached YER 8,891/person/month in areas under control of Sana'a-based authorities. While being just one percent above the level of Q1-2022, the cost of MFB in June was 38 percent above the level in 2021 and nearly four times the pre-crisis level. The largest annual increase was observed in Amran, Al Mahwit, Al Hodeidah, Sana'a City and Hajjah, which are all projected to have districts with populations in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) during the second half of 2022.<sup>44</sup>

High global food prices and ongoing increases in the taxes imposed by authorities in Sana'a were the primary drivers of the increase in food prices in the north.<sup>45</sup> On the upside, the truce had an alleviating effect on food prices due to the improved fuel supply to northern governorates and the currency appreciation.

### Prices of essential food items

Q2-2022 reflected some improvement in prices of essential food items compared to the previous quarter, however remaining at an elevated level compared to 2021.

The price of wheat flour as the most important commodity in the food basket slightly decreased by one percent across Yemen compared to Q1-2022. However, it remained 88 percent and 38 percent above the level of 2021 in areas under IRG and Sana'a-based authorities respectively. We found similar trends for the other main staple food items such as vegetable oil, red beans and sugar.





According to analysis from ACAPS in March<sup>46</sup>, food prices across Yemen were expected to remain high in the coming months as the Ukraine-Russia conflict continues to push global prices of food and fuel, yet details will also depend on the evolution of the truce and efforts to tackle the macroeconomic issues as mentioned above.

<sup>43,44</sup> IPC 2022

<sup>45</sup> Aden Gad News

<sup>46</sup> ACAPS, Mar 2022





### Household access to food<sup>47</sup>

Despite the positive effects of the truce, food insecurity reached critically high levels in June, similar to March 2022. Half of all households were unable to meet an adequate diet with 24 percent reporting severe food consumption gaps.<sup>48</sup>

The macroeconomic crisis, continued reduction in humanitarian food assistance and near all-time high food prices are the key drivers of the widespread food consumption gaps. In June, 54 percent reported unemployment and reduced wages as the main challenge restricting their access to food. Additionally, high food prices and increasing household expenditures on health were reported by 21 and eight percent respectively.

### Inadequate food consumption


At the end of Q2-2022, the share of households with inadequate food consumption in Yemen remained critically high, similar to the previous quarter (50 percent), while being 25 percent above the level in June 2021.

In line with previous years, a short-term improvement was seen during the holy month of Ramadan in April due to generosities from communities and charity organizations towards the most vulnerable. Despite the improvement, the prevalence of inadequate food consumption was 15 percent above the level recorded during Ramadan 2021. This outlines the overall deterioration of the food security situation, even in the best month for household food access.

<sup>47</sup> OCHA, Jun 2022

<sup>48</sup> WFP mVAM

**↑ Inadequate food consumption by region**




In May food insecurity levels immediately bounced back to pre-Ramadan levels, increasing from 39 percent in April to 47 percent, and then rose to 50 percent in June. The prevalence of poor food consumption in June is very concerning as it reached the highest level since 2018 after a quarterly increase of 14 percent and an annual increase of 60 percent.


In terms of regional differences, northern and southern areas showed worrying food access levels; yet households in the south are slightly worse off and increasingly so, with inadequate food consumption in IRG areas reported by 52 percent of interviewed households compared to 49 percent in areas under Sana'a-based authorities.

In 18 out of the 22 governorates in Yemen, the share of households reporting inadequate food consumption surpassed the “very high” threshold<sup>49</sup> during June 2022. In Lahj and Ad Dali’ at the extremes, approximately seven in every ten households indicated an inadequate diet. Families in these two governorates also reflected the highest prevalence of poor food consumption. Besides elevated food prices and lower levels of humanitarian food assistance, the violence in Ad Dali’ during June<sup>50</sup> has also affected people’s access to adequate food.

**South**



**North**




Compared to Q1-2022, households in Sa'dah reported the largest deterioration (up by 28 percent), followed by Al Hodeidah and Abyan (16 percent) and Ma'rib (11 percent).

<sup>49</sup> ≥40 percent of interviewed households


<sup>50</sup> ACLED, Jun 2022



Map 1: Inadequate food consumption (June 2022)



Poor food consumption by governorate (June 2022)




### Food-based coping strategies

Yemini families are increasingly dependent on food-based coping mechanisms to sustain their minimum food needs. Similar to the peak in food consumption gaps, the reduced Coping Strategy Index (rCSI), which reflects the stress level a household faces when exposed to food shortage, reached its highest level since 2018 in Q2-2022, three percent up from Q1-2022 and 20 percent above the level of 2021. The share of households deploying “high” food-based coping<sup>51</sup> was more severe in areas under Sana’a-based authorities than in areas under IRG (60 percent and 50 percent respectively).

During Q2-2022, approximately four in every five households indicated limiting meal sizes, while three in four respondents relied on less preferred or less expensive food to cope with food consumption gaps. 41 percent had to borrow, while two in every three households reduced the food consumption of adult members for children to eat. This latter strategy is considered the most severe and alarmingly highlights the food related stress. the use increased by 18 percent since last year.

Households reporting food coping strategy in June 2022




<sup>51</sup> rCSI >= 19

### Dietary diversity

The increased hardship has pushed many families to compromise the quality and diversity of their diets. The share of households eating pulses or dairy products less than once a week only reached 37 percent and 39 percent respectively by June, marking an increase of 16 percent and 30 percent compared to Q1-2022. Additionally, the share of households not eating any animal-source protein remained at 47 percent in Q2-2022.

Food consumption patterns




Households with poor food consumption tend to survive merely on calories from cereals, fats and sugars. In addition, these households consume vegetables one day a week, pulses once every three weeks and hardly consume any meat, dairy or fruits at all. The findings were similar during Ramadan, highlighting the dire situation for vulnerable populations and indicating a diminishing social safety net.

### Access to food for IDPs

The agreed truce has led to 60 percent decrease in the number of people newly displaced during Q2-2022 compared to the previous quarter. However, with an estimated 4.3 million IDPs, Yemen remained the fourth largest displacement crisis

in the world.<sup>52</sup> Internally displaced people (IDPs) continued to face severe hardship as “nearly 40 percent of IDPs are living in unofficial displacement camps and do not have adequate access to basic services”<sup>53</sup> and 56 percent have no source of income generating activities<sup>54</sup>. Moreover, heavy rains and floods in June 2022 negatively impacted 6,800 households, leading especially IDPs in affected areas to lose shelters, food supplies and household items.<sup>55</sup>

Poor and borderline consumption by displacement status



According to mVAM data, IDPs faced more hardship than the general population in terms of both food consumption gaps and coping. Overall, 53 percent of IDPs faced inadequate food consumption by the end of Q2-2022, which is eight percent above the food insecurity level of resident households. At 53 percent, the level is slightly higher than in Q1-2022 and 26 percent above the same period last year. Additionally, IDPs reflected a higher prevalence of poor food consumption at 26 percent in June 2022, compared to 21 percent in March 2022 and 15 percent in June 2021. Furthermore, 96 percent of the surveyed IDPs adopted food-based coping strategies during Q2-2022 to meet their basic food needs.

<sup>52</sup> OCHA  
<sup>53</sup> Euro-Med Human Right Monitor  
<sup>54</sup> UNHCR Yemen, Dec 2021  
<sup>55</sup> Yemen Humanitarian Update, Jun 2022


### Situation for beneficiaries in the 23 districts with population in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe)

The IPC analysis released in March 2022 reflected high levels of acute food insecurity in Yemen including 23 districts in 10 governorates where 161,000 people were projected to face Catastrophe food security outcomes (IPC Phase 5) from June to December 2022.<sup>56</sup>

According to monitoring data for WFP beneficiaries, interviewed households in the 23 districts reflected high levels of food insecurity during Q2-2022. At 84 percent, households in Bakil Al Mir and Mustaba in Hajjah were worst off while the lowest level of food consumption gaps was recorded in Al Hawak in Al Hodeidah (41 percent). Furthermore, around 77 percent of surveyed households in Al Azariq (Ad Dali'), Abs (Hajjah), Mazhar (Raymah) and Barat Al Anan (Al Jawf) reported inadequate food consumption. Since Q1-2022, households in Barat Al Anan (Al Jawf) and Dar Sa'd (Aden) reported the largest deterioration (35 percent).

Furthermore, nearly all 23 districts reported an increasing use of coping to cover food needs compared to Q1-2022. This was more evident in Barat Al Anan, Al Jawf where nearly all households (96 percent) were applying either crisis or emergency livelihood-based coping during Q2-2022. Additionally, nine in every ten households applied severe levels of livelihood-based coping strategies in six districts. The dire living conditions and the deterioration of households coping capacity across the 23 districts are concerning, particularly in light of the continued reduction of humanitarian food assistance in Yemen.

Inadequate food consumption for beneficiaries in the 23 districts with population in IPC Phase 5 (Q2-2022)



<sup>56</sup> At the time of writing this report an IPC analysis update is being undertaken to reflect updates of the assumptions used in March 2022 for the projection period June-December 2022. Once released, the new figures will be reflected in the quarterly report.





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