ALNAP is a global network of humanitarian organisations, including UN agencies, members of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, NGOs, donors, academics and consultants dedicated to learning how to improve the response to humanitarian crises.

The full report and other supporting materials are available at: alnap.org/sohs

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The views contained in this report do not necessarily reflect those of ALNAP Members.

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This is the fourth edition of *The State of the Humanitarian System* report, covering the three years from 2015-2017.

**The report:**
- Outlines humanitarian needs over the past three years.
- Provides an overview of the funding provided to meet these needs and how and where this funding was spent.
- Describes the current size and structure of the humanitarian system.
- Presents an assessment of the system’s performance in addressing humanitarian needs.

**It is based on:**
- a literature review
- a review of 200+ evaluations of humanitarian action
- key informant interviews with 151 humanitarian leaders and experts
- five country case studies and 346 interviews with humanitarian practitioners, government representatives and crisis-affected people
- an aid recipient survey with 5,000 responses from people receiving humanitarian assistance and/or protection
- a practitioner survey with 1,170 responses from people providing assistance/protection
- reviews of databases including: OECD DAC; OCHA FTS, Development Initiatives’ database on private funding and Humanitarian Outcomes’ database on NGO staffing and expenditure

Surveys of:
- **1,170** aid practitioners
- **116** countries
- **28** governments
- **5,000** aid recipients from Afghanistan, DRC, Ethiopia, Iraq and Kenya...

Interviews with around **500 PEOPLE**

and case studies on five different countries: **Bangladesh, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Yemen**

...informed the **SOHS 2018**.
Figure 1 / The geographical spread of SOHS 2018 components by country

Note: This map shows the countries where evidence was gathered for the SOHS 2018. Where components recorded geographical data these have been visualised above. This map is not to scale.
### Table 1 / Progress against SOHS performance criteria by study period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOHS 2018 (compared to SOHS 2015)</th>
<th>Sufficiency</th>
<th>No progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Despite increased funding, the system still does not have sufficient resources to cover needs. This is a result of growing numbers of people in need of humanitarian assistance and also, potentially, of increased ambition on the part of the humanitarian sector.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>Decline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Poor coverage of internally displaced people (IDPs) outside camps identified in the 2015 report has not been effectively addressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Concerns about addressing the needs of people and communities hosting refugees have increased.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The ability of people to access humanitarian assistance in situations of conflict has got worse, with governments and non-state armed groups increasingly denying access or using bureaucracy to hinder access.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Humanitarian coverage has been poor for large numbers of irregular migrants.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Relevance &amp; appropriateness</th>
<th>Limited progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Humanitarian aid comprises a basic package of life-saving assistance, which is seen as relevant in many situations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Priority protection needs are often not met, although there has been increased focus on this area in country strategies over the period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Needs beyond the acute, immediate response ‘package’ are often not understood and generally not met.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The specific needs of the elderly and people with disabilities are often not met, but the system has taken limited steps to better meet the specific needs of women and girls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Multi-purpose cash grants can go some way to increasing the relevance of aid.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Accountability &amp; participation</th>
<th>Limited progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The main challenge identified in the 2015 report – that feedback mechanisms are in place, but do not influence decision-making – has not been addressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• While there are a number of initiatives and approaches that show potential, they have not yet delivered greater accountability or participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Many interviewees are concerned that AAP is becoming a ‘box-ticking exercise’.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Improvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Effectiveness in meeting immediate life-saving needs in ‘natural’ disasters and in responding to sudden movements of refugees has been maintained, although agencies have found it hard to identify their role and objectives in the European Migration ‘Crisis’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Effectiveness – including timeliness – improved in responding to food insecurity in complex emergencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The system is still not effective in meeting protection needs overall, but there are more examples of specific programmes meeting (often quite limited) protection objectives. Do no harm approaches appear to be more commonly used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The quality of responses appears to have improved.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**SOHS 2015 (compared to SOHS 2012)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sufficiency &amp; coverage</strong></td>
<td>Decline</td>
<td>• Despite an increase in funding, overall coverage decreased.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Most gaps were seen in support for chronic crises, including deficits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>in funding, technical capacity, and recruitment, as well as access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>constraints.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Some coverage improvements were cited in responses to natural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>disasters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Perceptions of sufficiency among humanitarian actors surveyed dropped to 24% (from 34% in 2012).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• More pessimism was expressed about ability to reach people in need in conflicts, mostly due to insecurity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relevance &amp; appropriateness</strong></td>
<td>No progress</td>
<td>• A slight majority (51%) said needs assessment had improved but saw no progress in engaging local participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Some methodological innovations occurred in needs assessment, but no consensus was reached on tools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• More feedback mechanisms were developed, but there is little evidence of affected populations' input to project design or approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness</strong></td>
<td>Mixed progress</td>
<td>• Improvements were noted in both timeliness and mortality/morbidity outcomes in rapid responses to major natural disasters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Improvements were noted in coordination, and in quality of leadership and personnel in major emergencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Performance was poor in conflict settings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• A majority of survey respondents graded effectiveness low.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Cross-cutting issues have not yet been systematically addressed. Most progress has been in the area of gender, but more needs to be done in the areas of age and disability.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 1 / Progress against SOHS performance criteria by study period (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>SOHS 2018 (compared to SOHS 2015)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Efficiency</strong></td>
<td>Limited progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The main constraints to efficiency identified in the 2015 report – particularly non-harmonised reporting and ‘pass through’ arrangements for funding – have not been addressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increased work on early response – and particularly the use of social safety nets – has prevented inefficient ‘peak of crisis’ response in some areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Some improvements have been made in joint procurement and supply chains within the UN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increased use of cash has increased efficiency in many (but not all) areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The ‘Grand Bargain’ process, initiated during the study period, aims to address a number of areas related to efficiency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coherence</strong></td>
<td>Decline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The increased integration of humanitarian action into development and stabilisation agendas has made coherence with humanitarian principles more difficult for operational agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Humanitarians are operating in a context of declining respect for International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Refugee Law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Connectedness</strong></td>
<td>Improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Changes in policy and increases in funding have led to closer connections between humanitarian and development activities, often in the form of ‘resilience’ work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• There is some evidence that this has been effective at protecting against future shocks where the work has been done with governments, and where it addresses foreseeable ‘natural’ disasters (droughts, earthquakes).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• There is much less evidence that this work is effective in other circumstances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• There has been a significant increase in interest among donors in fragile states and refugee-hosting states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Development financing is increasingly available for the provision of services in countries experiencing conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Donors are supporting more ‘developmental’ approaches to refugee situations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Donors are also supporting work in ‘stabilisation’ and peace-building; many humanitarian agencies are not engaged, or do not wish to engage, with this work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Complementarity²</strong></td>
<td>Improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Relations with the governments of crisis-affected states are improving in many cases, although there is still a tendency to push governments aside in rapid-onset, ‘surge’ situations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Relations with governments are often more difficult where the state is a party to internal armed conflict or in refugee contexts. There has been an increase in governments using bureaucratic obstacles to hinder the provision of impartial humanitarian assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• There has been significant activity at policy level in strengthening the role of national and local NGOs in the international humanitarian system, but, to date, this has had limited effect on the ground.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impact</strong></td>
<td>Insufficient information to draw a conclusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SOHS 2018 (compared to SOHS 2015)

#### Efficiency

**Limited progress**

- No significant change or new development was noted since the last review.
- A few small-scale (project-level) examples of new efficiencies were noted.
- Some inefficiencies were cited in surge response to Typhoon Haiyan and in the Syrian Refugee Response.

#### Coherence

**No progress**

- Stabilisation and counter-terror agendas continued to influence donors’ humanitarian funding decisions.
- Donor firewalling of humanitarian aid, and their consideration of principles, has weakened.
- There is a perception of increasing instrumentalisation and politicisation of humanitarian assistance, including by affected states.
- Despite the rise of the resilience concept, no progress occurred in changing aid architecture to suit, or in phasing in development resources earlier in the response and recovery phases.

#### Connectedness

**Limited progress**

- Limited progress in Asia was outweighed by lack of progress in many other regions.
- Survey participants saw little participation and consultation of local authorities.
- Consultation and participation of recipients ranked poorest among practitioners.
Humanitarian needs continued to increase in 2015–17. An estimated 201 million people required international humanitarian assistance in 2017, the highest number to date (see figure 2). The number of people forcibly displaced by conflict and violence also increased, reaching 68.5 million in 2017. A small number of complex crises received the majority of funding: over the three years, half of all international humanitarian assistance went to just four crises (Syria, Yemen, South Sudan and Iraq). Syria alone received 28% of total funding in 2017. This increasing concentration of funding was accompanied by a gradual shift in the geographic location of recipients, from sub-Saharan Africa to the Middle East (see figure 3). Most international assistance went to countries affected by multiple types of crisis: generally conflict-affected countries that were also hosting refugees or experiencing ‘natural’ disasters (see figure 4).

A small number of donor governments contributed the majority of international humanitarian assistance over 2015–17: the three largest donors accounted for 59% of all government contributions in 2017, against 56% in 2014. Most donor funding (60% in 2016) went to multilateral agencies. However, as much of this money was then passed on as grants to non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Humanitarian spending by the UN and by humanitarian NGOs was similar: UN agencies spent $16Bn, while NGOs spent $16.6 billion in 2017. Among the NGOs, funding was concentrated among large, international organisations: in 2017 the six largest international NGOs accounted for 23% of total NGO spending. At the other end of the scale, national and local NGOs only received 0.4% of all international humanitarian assistance directly.

Growth in humanitarian funding was reflected in a growing number of field personnel in the humanitarian sector. By 2017, humanitarian agencies employed approximately 570,000 people in their operations— an increase of 27% from the last SOHS report (see figure 5). Growing numbers of national humanitarian workers appeared to drive this increase, while the number of international (expatriate) staff remained stable.

Money for pooled funds reached a record $1.3 billion in 2017, 53% higher than in 2014. Cash transfers also grew, to an estimated $2.8 billion in 2016, a 40% increase on 2015. Additional channels of resourcing for crisis and refugee situations were established over the period, largely in parallel to existing humanitarian financing. Several multilateral development banks provided significant financing in crisis contexts between 2015 and 2017, in some cases larger than expenditure through the humanitarian system.
Figure 2 / Number of people in need and top three countries by region, 2017

23% of people in need in 2017 were living in just three countries: Yemen, Syria and Turkey.

Sources: Development Initiatives based on ACAPS, FAO, GRFC Population in Crisis, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters and UN OCHA.

Notes: DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo. Region naming conventions used throughout this report are primarily based on those used by the OECD DAC; the Middle East and North of Sahara regions have been combined.
Figure 3 / Concentration of funding by region (2008–2017)

Middle East and North of Sahara
- $960m
- $1,354m
- $757m
- $1,073m
- $1,952m
- $4,266m
- $5,540m
- $7,524m
- $9,420m
- $8,506m

Africa South of Sahara
- $5,203m
- $4,746m
- $3,760
- $5,010m
- $5,211m
- $4,602m
- $7,962m
- $5,997m
- $6,973m
- $7,200m

Europe
- $44m
- $22m
- $16m
- $35m
- $85m
- $161m
- $514m
- $726m
- $1,489m
- $1,668m

South and Central Asia
- $1,570m
- $1,769m
- $3,867m
- $1,394m
- $1,100m
- $867m
- $981m
- $1,322m
- $1,084m
- $1,085m

South America
- $80m
- $69m
- $116m
- $72m
- $56m
- $62m
- $90m
- $71m
- $112m
- $80m

Far East Asia
- $405m
- $302m
- $117m
- $810m
- $159m
- $705m
- $388m
- $115m
- $121m
- $85m

Oceania
- $2m
- $21m
- $6m
- $14m
- $9m
- $16m
- $15m
- $54m
- $82m
- $21m

North and Central America
- $242m
- $58m
- $3,261m
- $452m
- $132m
- $93m
- $189m
- $93m
- $245m
- $194m


Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data.
Notes: Data is in constant 2016 prices. Totals are shown by crisis rather than country. Totals in this chart will differ from those calculated by country and from those based on UN appeals only in figure 9 in the full report.
Refugee hosting only
US$1058m

Conflict only
$310m

Conflict and refugee hosting
$9805m

Conflict, refugee and ‘natural’ hazards
$4242m

‘Natural’ hazard only
US$147m

Refugee hosting and ‘natural’ hazard
$1262m

Figure 4 / International humanitarian assistance by crisis type, 2017

Source: Development Initiatives based on ACAPS, FAO, UNHCR, UNRWA, INFORM Index for Risk Management, CRED and FTS data.
Notes: Complex crises in the chart comprise those countries that were marked as having scored the criteria for all three of the types of crisis above (conflict, refugee crisis and ‘natural’ hazards). ‘Other’ refers to those recipients that were not specified and therefore could not be coded using DI’s methodology. Data in constant prices 2016. Diagram not to scale. Calculations are based on shares of country-allocable humanitarian assistance. Totals in this chart will differ from those calculated by crisis, rather than country, in figures 11 and 14, and from those based on UN appeals only in figure 9 in the full report.

Figure 5 / National and international humanitarian field personnel

Notes: The figures shown are for the calendar years 2013 (SOHS 2015) and 2017 (SOHS 2018).
**PERFORMANCE OF THE SYSTEM**

**Sufficiency – are resources sufficient to meet needs?**

Despite concerns that economic and political conditions in major donor countries may lead to a fall in humanitarian funding, volumes continued to rise, albeit at a much slower rate than in previous periods. Requests for funding also increased significantly over the period, and as a result there was no improvement in sufficiency: available resources were still inadequate to meet needs. UN appeals were on average 58% funded over the period. Increased funding requests appear to reflect an increase in the number of people needing humanitarian assistance; the increased costs of providing a greater variety of services to people in crisis; and the higher costs of providing services to urban and middle-income populations and people in conflict areas.

**Figure 6 / Requirements against funding in UN-coordinated appeals (2008–2017)**

Sources: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data. Notes: 2012 data includes the Syria Regional Response Plan (3RP) monitored by UNHCR. 2015 data does not include the Yemen Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan. To avoid double counting of the regional appeals with the country appeals in 2015, the Burundi Regional Refugee Response Plan does not include the DRC component, CAR’s Regional Refugee Response Plan only includes the Republic of Congo component, and the Nigeria Regional Refugee Response Plan does not include any country component. 2016 and 2017 data does not include regional appeals tracked via UNHCR (CAR and Yemen in 2016; South Sudan, Burundi and Nigeria in 2016 and 2017). Data is in current prices. Totals in this chart will differ from those calculated by crisis, rather than country, in Figures 11 and 14 in the full report.
The degree to which funding was sufficient to meet needs also varied by country and activity – some sectors were consistently better-funded than others. Food security was, on average, 57% funded, while emergency shelter was only 29% funded. Disaster preparedness accounted for just 3.7% of total funding in 2016.

Coverage – does assistance and protection reach everyone in need?

Coverage is getting worse. In some cases, the humanitarian system has overlooked crises – generally because they are in countries with authoritarian governments that prevent access, or because the people in acute need fall outside the accepted scope of humanitarian action. Alternatively, the system might respond to a crisis, but particular areas or groups may simply be missed out. Coverage was particularly poor in remote, sparsely populated areas, areas where there was a high risk (or perceived risk) to humanitarian staff, areas under siege, and for displaced people outside camps and irregular migrants. Marginalised groups – particularly minority ethnic and cultural groups and the elderly – were most likely to be overlooked. There are also signs that some humanitarian agencies have become more risk-averse and less willing to operate in areas deemed to be high risk, and that a number of governments are becoming more confident in using bureaucratic delaying tactics to prevent humanitarian agencies from reaching areas in need of assistance.

Relevance and appropriateness – do humanitarian activities address the most important needs?

The humanitarian system is generally able to identify and prioritise those activities most important in keeping people alive in acute crisis (health assistance, clean water and particularly – according to affected people themselves – food). Humanitarian agencies are generally less good at identifying and programming for the most relevant protection activities, or meeting priority needs once the initial phase of the crisis has passed. The system is also generally poor at understanding the specific vulnerabilities of particular population groups, and often fails to ensure that assistance is relevant to the needs of the elderly or disabled people. There have been some improvements – at a policy level at least – in making responses more relevant to women.

Of the 5,000 aid recipients who took part in the SOHS 2018 survey, 87% responded ‘yes’ (39%) or ‘partially’ (48%) when asked whether the assistance received addressed their most important needs. These responses were more positive than in previous surveys.
These weaknesses were mentioned in the 2012 and 2015 editions of the SOHS and appear to be unchanged. However, there do appear to have been some improvements related to relevance over the last three years. Assessments have improved (although monitoring remains very weak) and the increased use of multi-purpose cash grants has allowed some aid recipients to decide on their priorities for themselves.

Accountability and participation – are people involved in decision-making and able to hold humanitarians to account?

Accountability combines a growing number of activities concerned with regulating the relationship and power imbalances between people affected by crisis and humanitarian agencies. The State of the Humanitarian System report focuses on two areas in particular: participation in decision-making by affected people, and the degree to which humanitarian agencies are held accountable for the decisions they make on behalf of affected people.

The research strongly suggests that consulting people and enabling them to give feedback on programmes enhances their sense of dignity, and their perceptions of the quality and relevance of aid (see figure 7).

However, consultation is a limited form of participation, and the views of crisis-affected people do not seem to have influenced or changed humanitarian plans in any meaningful way. The focus on information collection systems also made many people feel that the issue was becoming bureaucratised and seen as a ‘box-ticking exercise’. There were more ambitious examples of ‘handing power over’ in humanitarian programming, but they were generally isolated, and did not lead to changes in the system as a whole.
The picture was similar with respect to accountability: reporting mechanisms increased, but on their own they are not enough to improve accountability. There was also some progress on making people aware of their rights and entitlements, but very little headway was made on mechanisms for redressing grievances or imposing sanctions. Despite high-level attention to the issue of sexual abuse and exploitation, movement on the ground was slow.

Effectiveness – Do programmes achieve their objectives, on time and at acceptable quality?

The humanitarian system was generally effective in meeting life-saving objectives in 2015–17. It appeared to have improved in this area since 2015, notably in its response to food insecurity. Progress on meeting protection objectives was mixed, although the system recorded some notable successes in this area. The system was less effective at addressing longer-term and resilience objectives.

Of the 1,170 practitioners who completed the SOHS 2018 survey, 52% felt that the achievement of objectives was good or excellent. An improvement from 42% in the 2015 survey.

The timeliness of responses improved, albeit not across the board. There was a much faster response to indications of famine in the Horn of Africa than previously, and responses were also timely in highly visible rapid-onset disasters, such as the earthquake in Nepal and the movement of Rohingya people into Bangladesh. Responses were slower in less well-publicised crises in countries with a long-term humanitarian presence. A final, and significant, area of improvement was in the quality of responses, particularly as perceived by aid recipients (see figure 8).
### Figure 8 / SOHS aid recipient aggregate survey responses – SOHS 2012, 2015 and 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Were you satisfied with the amount of aid you received?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were you satisfied with the quality of aid you received?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The countries covered by the SOHS aid recipient surveys are as follows: 2012: DRC, Pakistan, Haiti and Uganda; 2015: DRC, Pakistan and the Philippines; 2018: DRC, Kenya, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Iraq.

### Efficiency – do programmes use the lowest possible level of funding and resources?

A lack of budgetary information and valid comparisons with other service providers makes it difficult to say whether humanitarian aid is generally efficient or not. Available information suggests that the system is not inherently inefficient, but also that there are numerous areas where efficiency could be improved. In 2015-2017 modest progress was made, largely through the increased use of preparedness and early warning mechanisms, better integration of humanitarian activities into social safety nets, increased use of technology and cash programming and moves to establish common procurement mechanisms and supply chains. There was less progress on the systemic and structural barriers to efficiency – such as overlaps between agencies and multiple, often duplicated, reporting requirements to different donors.

Of the 1,170 practitioners who completed the SOHS 2018 survey, 53% of respondents thought that performance around ‘efficient use of resources’ was good (44%) or excellent (9%).

53%
Coherence – does humanitarian action comply with and support humanitarian principles and international humanitarian law?

Coherence (in this report and summary) means the degree to which humanitarian agencies follow core humanitarian principles, and the degree to which their actions encourage support for IHL and Refugee Law. There is a sense among humanitarian agencies that this has become more difficult: increased security concerns have forced difficult choices between staff safety and the provision of assistance to people in need. Security and developmental agendas at policy level have also made it more difficult to provide humanitarian aid in an impartial and neutral way. Humanitarian actors are also concerned that they are becoming more closely involved in attempts by states to control flows of migrants and refugees.

Humanitarian advocacy and negotiation have improved, and donor states – often supported or lobbied by other humanitarian actors – have created agreements to support IHL. However, these appear to have had limited effect on the ground, and there were numerous flagrant breaches of IHL and Refugee Law. While this is not new, there are signs that the situation has got worse, and states that previously supported the international legal regime are increasingly acting in ways that suggest this support is weakening.

Connectedness – how well does humanitarian action address the causes of need, or link with activities that do?

Connectedness has seen significant movement over the last three years, and the humanitarian sector is increasingly engaging with the underlying problems of poverty, vulnerability and conflict. These activities have been effective in some cases – particularly in work with governments to address vulnerability to recurrent ‘natural’ disasters – but in other contexts there is much less evidence of success and this is still the worst performing criterion in the practitioner survey.

Some agencies and practitioners question the relevance of connectedness for humanitarian action, and argue that humanitarians should focus on life-saving activities. Beyond these concerns, the main constraints to success relate to links, relationships and coordination with development actors. While development actors are frequently present in crisis contexts, humanitarian counterparts have generally not been good at handing over programmes, and joint planning and implementation is difficult. Particularly in conflicts, this reflects a lack of development planning and structures within governments.

Of the 1,170 practitioners who completed the SOHS 2018 survey, 33% of respondents felt that performance related to connectedness between humanitarian, development and/or peacekeeping activities was excellent or good, making it the worst performing criterion in the survey.
At the same time, the international community (beyond the humanitarian system) has begun to engage more robustly with the challenges of poverty and insecurity in fragile states. Humanitarians have complained for years that development actors do not involve themselves in these contexts. In the period 2015–17, this changed. Significant amounts of funding and assistance were allocated – bilaterally or through international funding institutions – to states experiencing conflict or hosting large numbers of refugees. It remains to be seen how humanitarian actors will adapt to these changes in the operational and funding environment.

Complementarity – does the international humanitarian system recognise and support the capacities of national actors?

National actors (governments and civil society) are central to many humanitarian responses. In the five countries where the aid recipient survey was conducted, 45% of respondents received aid from the government or local/national civil society groups, and 34% from international organisations. The survey did not show any consistent difference between the quality, relevance or speed of responses led by international or by national actors.

Overall, relationships between international actors and crisis affected states are improving – although this varies significantly from one situation to another. In general the more the state takes a lead role in the response, the better the relationship with international actors. However, this is not always the case – particularly where the government is party to a major internal conflict and in refugee-hosting situations. Problems have also emerged in rapid-onset emergencies, where there is still a tendency for humanitarian surge deployments to ignore local capacity.

The 2015–17 period saw an increased focus on the role of national and local NGOs in humanitarian response. Various policy initiatives were given significant impetus by the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit and follow-up activities. In particular, there was widespread agreement on the need to increase the funding going directly to national and local NGOs, to help these organisations to develop their capacity and to build more genuine partnerships. However, while a number of donors and operational agencies have taken action in these areas, overall progress since the Summit has been limited.

Of the 1,170 practitioners who completed the SOHS 2018 survey, 52% felt that the participation/consultation of local actors was good or excellent, a steady increase from previous surveys: 42% in 2015 and 38% in 2012.
Impact – what are the long-term consequences of humanitarian action?

Impact is at once one of the most important and least understood aspects of humanitarian performance. For years, academics and commentators have suggested that humanitarian action might, unintentionally, do more harm than good, particularly in situations of conflict. However, there is little hard data measuring the impact of humanitarian responses on wider populations or across time. Very few evaluations attempt to assess impact, in part because the short funding cycles of humanitarian action prevent consistent longitudinal research. There is also a lack of baseline data against which to measure progress. Overall, information on impact is scattered and largely anecdotal, and does not allow any overall conclusion to be drawn.
Endnotes

1. People in need by country is calculated selecting the maximum number of people in need by cross-referencing five different databases:
   a. primary source – ACAPS (people in need published in the most recent weekly report from 2017)
   b. GRFC Population in Crisis (people in need gathered from 2018 Global Report on Food Crises)
   c. Global Humanitarian Overview 2018 report (people in need by country); d. UNHCR refugees, refugee-like situations and asylum-seekers
   e. UNRWA total of refugees (and IDPs in Palestine).
   The UNHCR and UNRWA data refers to the number of refugees (and IDPs) in hosting countries. As a result, this figure includes people in need numbers for countries beyond those with a UN-coordinated appeal and will therefore be higher than OCHA’s Humanitarian Needs Overview estimate.

2. This criterion was not looked at separately in previous reports. The improvement is based on comparison with information that was previously under other categories.

3. The analysis uses country-allocable only international humanitarian assistance figures and therefore totals will differ from aggregates calculated by donor or emergency in other analyses.

The full bibliography and list of acknowledgements for The State of the Humanitarian System 2018 report can be found at: alnap.org/sohs
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The State of the Humanitarian System 2015 and 2012

The State of the Humanitarian System 2010 (Pilot)

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