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# YEMEN FOOD SECURITY QUARTERLY REVIEW Q1-2023

## Key messages

- The key drivers of food insecurity have shown signs of improvement during Q1-2023. These include the decrease in global and local prices of food and fuel, the deceleration in currency depreciation in IRG-controlled areas, improved availability of fuel in local markets and reduced conflict.
- People's access to food has slightly improved. Nonetheless, around 46 percent of the surveyed households in Yemen indicated inadequate food consumption at the end of Q1-2023.
- WFP is currently facing severe funding shortfalls which could result in reductions in assistance.



## Summary<sup>1</sup>

**Conflict:** The UN-mediated truce continued to deliver much needed benefits to the Yemeni population, even after its official expiration in early October 2022. Due to military de-escalation, the number of civilian casualties and the level of displacement during Q1-2023 were nearly half the records observed in Q1-2022 (pre-truce period). However, armed violence relatively escalated compared to the previous quarter and limited clashes continued to be reported along several frontlines, particularly in Ma'rib, Ta'iz and Shabwah.

**Exchange rate:** In IRG-controlled areas, the Yemeni riyal slightly depreciated against the US dollar by four percent since the beginning of 2023 and by three percent year-on-year. In general, depreciation of the riyal decelerated during 2022 and Q1-2023 compared to 2021, largely due to the foreign currency auctions introduced by the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) in Aden since late 2021. In February 2023, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) granted CBY Aden USD one billion which were deposited at the Arab Monetary Fund and to be transferred to CBY-Aden afterwards, contingent upon implementing the set of reforms requested by KSA. At the same time, the exchange rate appreciated in areas under Sana'a-based authorities by two percent compared to the beginning of 2023 and by ten percent year-on-year, reaching YER 544/USD by the end of Q1-2023.

**Fuel imports:** Fuel supply significantly improved from April 2022 onwards due to the regular flow of fuel vessels as stipulated in the provisions of the truce. Accordingly, the overall volume of fuel imports during Q1-2023 through Red Sea ports was nearly six times the level recorded for the same period last year, during which the country was facing severe fuel shortages.


**Fuel prices:** Local fuel prices remained at similar levels nationwide compared to the previous quarter, while being much lower than the level recorded during Q1-2022. Year-on-year, the average pumping prices of petrol and diesel<sup>2</sup> decreased by around 20 percent in IRG-controlled areas, and by 23 percent in areas under Sana'a-based authorities. This decline is largely linked to the annual decrease in global crude oil prices and the improved fuel supply into the country, thanks to the truce.


**Food imports:** During Q1-2023, the total volume of food imports increased year-on-year by 33 percent through the southern ports of Aden and Mukalla and by 14 percent via the land ports of Shahen and Alwadeah, while it decreased by 13 percent via Red Sea ports. Overall, the net volume of food imported via all Yemeni ports was only three percent lower than the previous year. Overall, essential food items were available in the Yemeni markets during Q1-2023.


**Humanitarian food assistance:** WFP continued to target 13 million people each distribution cycle, however with a reduced ration due to critical shortages in funding. Based on the generous pledges from the donors in September 2022, WFP managed to increase the size of the dispatched food ration from 45 percent to 65 percent of the standard food basket during Q4-2022 and Q1-2023. Nonetheless, humanitarian funding for food assistance faces critical shortfalls for 2023.

<sup>1</sup> For more details, you can visit: [WFP Yemen food security and market monitoring dashboard](#)

<sup>2</sup> Pumping fuel price: the average of official price and commercial price of fuel sold through the gas stations

 **Global food prices:** In March 2023, the global FAO Food Price Index (FFPI) gradually decreased for the twelfth consecutive month, down by 21 percent from the all-time high level reached in March 2022. This decline is largely driven by resuming grain exports from Ukraine and increasing global food supply, as well as the marked decrease in the global prices of fertilizers. However, global food prices are still high, and concerns continue to prevail.

 **Minimum food basket:** During Q1-2023, the monthly average cost of MFB slightly decreased by two percent from the previous quarter in both areas under the control of IRG and Sana'a-based authorities. Year-on-year, the MFB cost saw a higher decline in the northern governorates (down by 15 percent) compared to eight percent across those in the south. The alleviation in local inflation of food prices is largely attributed to the continued decline in global food prices and the marked decrease in local prices of fuel. However, local food prices remain unaffordable, and nearly 20 percent of the surveyed households in the south and 12 percent in the north indicated high food prices as a principal challenge hindering them from accessing an adequate diet during Q1-2023.

 **Food insecurity:** At the end of Q1-2023, more than two in every five of the surveyed households in Yemen (46 percent) indicated lacking access to adequate food, with a higher proportion reported among households in IRG-controlled areas (52 percent) compared to those in areas under Sana'a-based authorities (44 percent). This nationwide trend was six percent lower than the previous quarter and eight percent lower than a year before. This decrease was largely driven by increased funding for assistance since September 2022, the decrease in global and local prices of fuel and food items, as well as the implications of truce on reducing incidents of violence. Nonetheless, food insecurity remains at alarming levels and Yemen is still one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world.

### Key drivers of food insecurity

The tangible benefits of the truce are still in effect, even though the agreement officially expired in early October 2022. This included de-escalating of military operations, facilitating the entry of fuel ships to Al Hodeidah port, and resuming commercial flights to Sana'a airport.

The positive implications of the truce on local fuel and food markets, combined with the alleviation in global food prices and the relative increase in funding for food assistance in September 2022 were collectively reflected in some decrease in the prevalence of

inadequate food consumption in Yemen during Q1-2023, in both regions; areas under IRG as well as areas under Sana'a-based authorities. This is consistent with the recent results for the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) for areas under IRG, which indicate a decrease in the total population in need (crisis level and above) during January-May 2023 by 23 percent compared to October-December 2022.<sup>3</sup> Despite this relative improvement in food security in 118 out of the 333 districts in Yemen, the situation is projected to slide back to increased levels of severe food insecurity starting June 2023.

Yemen remains one of the most concerning humanitarian crises in the world;<sup>4</sup> macroeconomic upheavals, food affordability in the international and local markets, the knock-on effects of Ukraine-Russia conflict, as well as the insufficient funding for life-saving assistance continued to drive the country into a severe levels of food insecurity in 2023.

### Conflict

The Yemeni population continues benefiting from the achievements of the truce even after its official expiration in early October 2022. The military de-escalation inside Yemen and across its borders has led to a reduction in the number of civilian casualties during Q1-2023 by around 47 percent, compared to Q1-2022 (pre-truce period).<sup>5</sup> At the same time, IOM estimated that approximately 14,820 people in Yemen were displaced at least once, marking less than half the level recorded during Q1-2022.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, the warring parties in Yemen agreed to release nearly 900 conflict-related detainees from all sides.<sup>7</sup>

However, the military activity relatively escalated compared to the previous quarter. Localized clashes continued to be reported along several frontlines during Q1-2023 especially in Ma'rib, Ta'iz and Shabwah.<sup>8</sup> These governorates also reflected the highest level of displacement during Q1-2023. Despite the lasting gains of the truce, the cumulative impact of the prolonged conflict remains one of the key drivers of acute food insecurity across the country. International stakeholders continue to lead diplomatic efforts between the warring parties in Yemen, aiming to pave the way towards a political settlement for a comprehensive and sustainable end to the conflict.<sup>9</sup>

### Exchange rate

Following eight years of conflict, Yemen remains one of the poorest countries in the Middle East and North Africa.<sup>10</sup> The profound economic crisis was due to a myriad of challenging headwinds, including the fragmented institutional capacity, the conflicting macroeconomic policies and the decline in foreign currency reserves.

<sup>3</sup> [IPC Yemen, May 2023](#)

<sup>4</sup> [Ibid](#)

<sup>5</sup> [CIMP, March 2023](#)


<sup>6</sup> [IOM, April 2023](#)

<sup>7</sup> [OSESGY, April 2023](#)

<sup>8</sup> [Ibid](#)

<sup>9</sup> [UN news, April 2023](#)

<sup>10</sup> [The World Bank, March 2023](#)



During Q1-2023, the exchange rate continued to fluctuate in IRG-controlled areas around similar levels to 2022. The Yemeni riyal slightly depreciated by three percent year-on-year against the US dollar, reaching YER 1,244/USD by end of March. The band of currency fluctuations has reduced since the beginning of 2022, and this is largely associated with the auctions of the US dollar which the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) in Aden has initiated since late 2021. During Q1-2023, CBY-Aden conducted 14 foreign currency auctions as a control measure to bolster the value of riyal and temper inflation.<sup>11</sup>

In February 2023, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) agreed to provide CBY-Aden with an economic support package, worth USD one billion. The deposit was not granted directly to CBY-Aden, however through the Arab Monetary Fund.<sup>12</sup> By the end of Q1-2023, the KSA deposit has not yet been transferred to CBY-Aden and there is no clear indication on the timeline for its transfer.

On the other hand, the rial appreciated by two percent during Q1-2023 in areas under Sana'a-based authorities compared to the beginning of 2023, and by ten percent year-on-year, reaching YER 544/USD by the end of March 2023.


### Fuel imports

One of the tangible lasting impacts of the truce is improved fuel supply in Yemen, particularly through Red Sea ports. During Q1-2023, the total volume of fuel imports through the northern ports of Al Hodeidah and Salif was nearly Six times the level recorded for the same period last year,<sup>13</sup> during which the country was running into acute fuel shortages. The steady flow of fuel vessels since the activation of the truce and until the end of Q1-2023 contributed to alleviating the pressure on food prices and essential services, as well as improved people's mobility, particularly in northern governorates.

At the same time, the overall volume of imported fuel via the southern ports of Aden and Mukalla was nearly one-third the level of imports compared to Q1-2022. This decline was offset by the significant increase in the level of fuel imports via Al Hodeidah port. It is noteworthy to mention that imports via Aden and Mukalla became a less efficient option for traders who are targeting the northern governorates.

Beyond fuel imports, the FSO Safer vessel<sup>14</sup> continues to pose substantial risks of causing an oil spill and/or a destructive explosion at any time. The potential oil spill would adversely affect over 200,000 livelihoods in Yemen and could lead to the closure of the northern ports of Al Hodeidah and Salif<sup>15</sup> – the key gateways for food and fuel supplies into the country. This is in addition to the disruption that is likely to affect the traffic of global shipping and economic activities.

### Fuel imports through Red Sea ports



<sup>11</sup> CBY Aden, March 2023;


<sup>12</sup> Ibid

<sup>13</sup> UNVIM, March 2023

<sup>14</sup> FSO Safer is a floating vessel moored off the Yemeni Red Sea coast and it contains more than a million barrels of oil

<sup>15</sup> OCHA, April 2023

Fuel prices



Data source: WFP monitoring data

Fuel prices

Global prices of crude oil experienced a downward trend, after having reached a ten-year high in mid of 2022. At the end of Q1-2023, global prices of fuel had declined by three percent compared to the previous quarter and by 33 percent year-on-year.<sup>16</sup> In April 2023, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other OPEC+ oil producers declared further cuts in oil production than previously planned.<sup>17</sup> This announcement has led to an immediate increase in global fuel prices, and is likely to adversely impact the global energy market throughout the rest of 2023, particularly given the continuation of the Ukraine-Russia conflict.

Local prices of fuel remained at similar levels compared to the previous quarter across the whole country. However, fuel prices saw a notable decrease nationwide from a year before. This is largely driven by the annual decline in global crude oil prices and the improved fuel supply into the country, thanks to the truce. WFP monitoring data revealed that the average pumping prices of petrol and diesel<sup>18</sup> decreased year-on-year by around 20 percent in IRG-controlled areas, and by 23 percent in areas under Sana'a-based authorities.

Food imports


During Q1-2023, the total volume of food imports discharged via the northern ports of Al Hodeidah and Salif (983,000 tons) decreased by 13 percent compared to the same period in 2022.<sup>19</sup> This decline is attributed to various factors, including the restrictions imposed by CBY-Sana'a in early 2023 that prevent commercial traders in the north from purchasing

foreign currency through CBY-Aden's auctions,<sup>20</sup> in addition to the frequently reported complaints on delaying goods at Al Hodeidah port to force traders to pay more levies.<sup>21</sup>

On the other hand, the overall volume of food imports through the southern ports of Aden and Mukalla (388,000 tons) increased by 33 percent year-on-year. Moreover, the comparatively low amount of food items imported via land ports of Shahan and Alwadeah (26,000 tons) increased by 14 percent compared to Q1-2022.<sup>22</sup> Nonetheless, the net volume of food imports through all ports in Yemen was slightly less than the volume of food imports in Q1-2022 (three percent lower). Overall, essential food items were available in Yemeni markets during Q1-2023.

Concerns over global food supply remain in 2023, particularly given the ongoing war in Ukraine and the projected drop in the 2022/23 global food stocks.<sup>23</sup> Approximately 37 export restrictive measures on food and fertilizer that were imposed since the beginning of Ukraine-Russia conflict were still in effect by mid-March 2023.<sup>24</sup> However, the Black Sea Grain Initiative to facilitate grain shipments from Ukraine has partly mitigated the pressure on global food supply and prices. This agreement resulted in seven vessels carrying around 235,618 metric tons of wheat grain directed to Yemen, of which 83,300 metric tons were shipped during Q1-2023.<sup>25</sup>

Food imports through Red Sea ports



Data source: UNVIM

<sup>16</sup> Energy Information Administration, March 2023  
<sup>17</sup> Reuters, April 2023

<sup>18</sup> Pumping fuel price: the average of official price and commercial price of fuel sold through the gas stations

<sup>19</sup> UNVIM, March 2023

<sup>20</sup> ACAPS, April 2023

<sup>21</sup> Arab news, March 2023


<sup>22</sup> FST5-Aden, March 2023

<sup>23</sup> IFPRI, March 2023

<sup>24</sup> The World Bank, April 2023


<sup>25</sup> Black Sea Grain Initiative Joint Coordination Centre, March 2023

### Food imports through Aden and Mukalla ports



Data source: Aden Ports Authority

### Level of humanitarian food assistance



Legend: Total number of assisted people (dashed line), Number of people receiving a reduced food basket (red dashed line), Number of people receiving a further reduced food basket (red dashed line), Number of people receiving the standard food basket (green dashed line).


### Volume of humanitarian food assistance

After more than eight years of conflict, the 2023 Humanitarian Needs Overview estimates that around 21.6 million people need humanitarian assistance in Yemen.<sup>26</sup> Of these, nearly 17 million people – over half of the Yemeni population – are likely to be facing high levels of acute food insecurity.<sup>27</sup>

However, funding for life-saving assistance is still insufficient. On 27 February 2023, the seventh annual pledging event for Yemen received pledges worth of only 30 percent of the 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) in the country,<sup>28</sup> marking the lowest amount this event has raised since 2017.<sup>29</sup>

As funding for food assistance in 2022 had increased starting the fifth distribution cycle (September 2022), WFP increased the food ration to 65 percent of the standard food basket and is currently targeting 13 million people each distribution cycle with that food ration.

### Poor food consumption by beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries



Data source: mVAM

<sup>26</sup> Yemen\_HNO, December 2022

<sup>28</sup> OCHA, March 2023

<sup>27</sup> IPC update, November 2022


<sup>29</sup> OCHA, March 2023

## Global food prices

After reaching an all-time high in March 2022, the global FAO Food Price Index (FFPI)<sup>30</sup> continued to decrease for twelve consecutive months, converging to levels prior to the Ukraine-Russia war. The average value of the FFPI in March 2023 had decreased by 21 percent compared to the previous year. This decline was mainly driven by the year-on-year decrease in the subindexes for oils and cereals by 48 percent and 19 percent respectively.

The inflationary pressure on food prices was alleviated, mainly due to the Black Sea Grain Initiative to facilitate food exports from Ukraine, and the increase in global food supply, particularly from Australia and the European Union, as well as the good summer harvests in the northern hemisphere in 2022 and the decline in the global prices of fertilizers (down by 35 percent year-on-year).<sup>31</sup> Nonetheless, global food prices were still high during Q1-2023 and close to the levels recorded in 2011. Uncertainty prevails with regards to the outlook for global food prices over 2023, especially with the continuation of Ukraine-Russia conflict.<sup>32</sup>

Global food price index (FFPI)



<sup>30</sup> [FAO, April 2023](#)

<sup>31</sup> [Index Mundi, December 2022](#)

<sup>32</sup> [The World Bank, March 2023](#)

## Local food prices (based on minimum food basket)<sup>33</sup>


### MFB in areas under control of the IRG

The monthly average cost of the MFB decreased during Q1-2023, down by two percent compared to the previous quarter and by eight percent from the all-time high level reached in March 2022. The ease in inflationary pressures in the south is largely attributed to the continued decline in global food prices and the marked drop in domestic prices of fuel.

As shown in the charts below, the annual decrease in the cost of MFB was driven by the decrease in the cost of essential food items. The prices of vegetable oil decreased by 41 percent year-on-year, and a similar trend was also observed for the prices of red beans and wheat flour which decreased by ten percent and five percent respectively during the same period.

All governorates in the south saw a decline in domestic food prices compared to the previous year, except for Al Maharah governorate where the cost of MFB remained almost unchanged. Abyan and Ma'rib governorates experienced the highest annual decrease in the cost of MFB, down by 24 percent and 21 percent, respectively.


Cost of the minimum food basket (MFB)




<sup>33</sup> The monitored minimum food basket includes 10.71 kg wheat flour, 1.43 kg red beans, 1.14 litres of vegetable oil, 0.36 kg sugar and 0.14 kg salt per person per month.

Despite the overall decrease in food prices during Q1-2023, the cost of the MFB in IRG-controlled areas (YER 15,739/person/month) was still nearly seven times the pre-crisis level. WFP mVAM monitoring data revealed that one in every five of the surveyed families in the south reported high food prices as a principal shock which limited households' ability to access adequate diet during Q1-2023.

### South



### North




## MFB in areas under control of the Sana'a-based authorities


The cost of MFB continued to decline in the north for the eighth consecutive month, reaching YER 7,472/person/month at the end of Q1-2023. This represents a two percent decrease compared to the previous quarter, and by 15 percent compared to Q1-2022. The key drivers of the recent decrease in food prices include currency appreciation in the north, the continued decrease in the prices of global food commodities, the decrease in local fuel prices, as well as the spot checks implemented by the authorities in Sana'a to control market prices across areas under Sana'a-based authorities.<sup>34</sup> All governorates witnessed a notable decrease in the cost of MFB compared to last year, except for Al Jawf governorate where the cost of MFB slightly increased by three percent year-on-year.

In terms of the prices of essential food items, the highest annual decrease was recorded in vegetable oil (down by 36 percent), followed by wheat flour (down by 16 percent) and red beans (down by 12 percent).

### Average prices of wheat flour



### Average prices of vegetable oil




<sup>34</sup> FEWS NET, March 2023






Average prices of red beans



Average prices of sugar



While the cost of MFB in areas under Sana'a-based authorities reached its lowest level since the beginning of 2022, food prices in March 2023 remain three times as high as pre-crisis level. The economic capacity of households to access food remains constrained; around 12 percent of the surveyed families in the north indicated high food prices as a main impediment preventing them from accessing adequate diet.

Household food security outcomes<sup>35</sup>

The impact of increased and more regular food assistance on food consumption in Q4 2022 was positive. In August 2022, the prevalence of poor food consumption had reached 34 percent, while during Q4 2022 and Q1 2023, the prevalence of poor food consumption amongst beneficiaries decreased by 53 percent down to 16 percent in March 2023.

<sup>35</sup> Analysis based on WFP mVAM data


During Q1-2023, also the prevalence of inadequate food consumption in Yemen saw a decrease compared to the previous quarter and year-on-year. This decline was largely attributed to the ongoing decrease in global and local prices of fuel and food items, the improved funding since September 2022, as well as the impact of the truce on de-escalating armed violence.

However, the levels of food insecurity as indicated by monthly monitoring results are still concerning. Lack of income opportunities and high food prices were the most frequently reported challenges restricting families' access to adequate food; 63 percent and 14 percent of the surveyed households nationwide, respectively, reported these two factors.

Inadequate food consumption

At the end of Q1-2023, the proportion of households lacking access to adequate food decreased by six percent compared to the previous quarter and by eight percent year-on-year, reaching 46 percent of the surveyed households during March. While March 2023 marked the lowest reported level of inadequate food consumption over the past twelve months,<sup>36</sup> food insecurity remains above the "very high"<sup>37</sup> threshold for inadequate food consumption, and Yemen is still identified among the worst humanitarian crises in the world.<sup>38</sup>

Inadequate food consumption by region





<sup>36</sup> Data during Ramadan has not been factored in the calculations

<sup>37</sup> The prevalence of inadequate food consumption >= 40 percent of the surveyed households

<sup>38</sup> The World Bank, March 2023

inadequate food consumption by governorate




Households in the south were worse off; more than half of the surveyed households in IRG-controlled areas (52 percent) were unable to meet their minimum food needs, down by two percent from the previous quarter and four percent higher than Q1-2022. The peak was recorded in Lahj (71 percent), followed by Shabwah and Ad Dhali' (65 percent). These governorates also reflected the highest prevalence of poor food consumption countrywide (between 35 and 37 percent).

On the other hand, the share of households reporting inadequate food consumption reached 44 percent in areas under Sana'a-based authorities, representing a six percent decrease from the previous quarter and a ten percent year-on-year decrease. Among the northern governorates, Al Bayda and Raymah were characterized by the highest prevalence of households with inadequate food consumption, where approximately three in every five surveyed households indicated having an inadequate diet.

Moreover, nearly one in every five households in Yemen (19 percent) reported poor food consumption by the end of Q1-2023. The diet of these households predominantly consists of cereals, fat and sugar while merely including vegetables one day a week or pulses once every two weeks and hardly containing any meat, dairy or fruits. The data collected through mVAM interviews revealed that around 56 percent of these surveyed households who reported poor food consumption have not consumed protein rich food items at all at the end of Q1-2023, an increase by eight percent year-on-year.


Food consumption patterns




Data source: mVAM

■ Cereals ■ Fats ■ Sugars ■ Vegetables ■ Pulses ■ Dairy ■ Proteins ■ Fruits

Map 1: Inadequate food consumption (March 2022)



Poor food consumption (March 2023)




<sup>39</sup> rCSI >= 19

### Coping strategies

At the end of Q1-2023, the reduced Coping Strategy Index (rCSI) – which reflects the stress level that a household faces in light of food shortages – remained at a similarly high level compared to the previous quarter, while it decreased by eight percent year-on-year. However, the prevalence of rCSI above the threshold of IPC Phase 3+<sup>39</sup> reached 49 percent by March 2023, with a larger share recorded amongst households in areas under Sana'a-based authorities (53 percent) compared to 42 percent in IRG-controlled areas.


The most frequently used strategies by the interviewed households were reducing meal portion size and consuming lower quality food. Both were adopted, respectively, by 72 percent and 69 percent of the surveyed families nationwide. In addition, more than three in every five households in Yemen (62 percent) restricted adults' food consumption to prioritize their children's food consumption needs. The adoption of this strategy, which is the most severe behaviour to cope with food shortages, was more pronounced amongst households across the northern governorates (65 percent) compared to 53 percent in the south.

Households reporting food coping strategies in March 2023



Moreover, the Yemeni population continues struggling to access livelihoods and sustainable income-generating activities during March 2023; the results indicate that around 69 percent of the surveyed households were casual labourers. Therefore, reliance on negative livelihood coping mechanisms was widespread across the country; approximately four in every five households in Yemen (77 percent) adopted “crisis” or “emergency” livelihood coping strategies<sup>40</sup> in order to meet their essential needs. These findings are concerning and indicate reduced levels of household resilience to withstand future shocks.

### Households reporting livelihood-based coping strategies



### Access to food for IDPs


While the number of newly displaced people during Q1-2023 reached the highest level since the activation of the truce (14,820 people), this level is still less than half the record observed during the same period last year (pre-truce level). However, with an estimated 4.5 million IDPs since 2015, Yemen is considered the sixth largest displacement crisis in the world.<sup>41</sup>

WFP mVAM monitoring data revealed that IDPs were facing more difficulties than residents in terms of coping and food consumption. Nearly half of the surveyed IDPs (49 percent) were unable to meet their minimum food needs during Q1-2023, nine percent above the


level recorded amongst resident households. In addition, around 93 percent of IDPs adopted at least one food-based coping behaviour to grapple with food shortages.

The prevalence of rCSI values above the threshold of IPC Phase 3 and above<sup>42</sup> reached 57 percent among IDPs, 27 percent higher compared to resident households. Furthermore, 81 percent of the surveyed IDPs were compelled to implement crisis or emergency type livelihood coping strategies.

### Displaced Households



### Non-Displaced Households



<sup>40</sup> Crisis strategies include selling productive assets, reducing medical/educational expenditures or withdrawing children from school. Emergency strategies include selling house/land/last female animal, or begging.

<sup>41</sup> [Yemen HNO, December 2022](#)

<sup>42</sup> rCSI >= 19



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